



Humanitarian Logistics

A Guide to Operational and Tactical Logistics in Humanitarian Emergencies



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> Foreword



This handbook addresses many of the common questions and pitfalls encountered by Air Force personnel involved in humanitarian logistics. However, as operations continue to evolve, implementation and execution will also change. Therefore, this book should be used as a reference only—Department of Defense and Air Force directives will always take precedence.

The views expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the US Government.

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> Introduction



Humanitarian assistance operations will increasingly become a required area of proficiency for Air Force logisticians. These operations present challenges not typically found in combat as a result of the urgency of planning, ambiguous command and control, and difficulty in communicating with numerous organizations both inside and outside of the Department of Defense (DoD). The most common lessons learned

from recent humanitarian actions reveal that poor coordination, lack of information sharing, inadequate education and training, inconsistent processes, and logistical capacity limitations impeded the logistics responsiveness of military missions. Clearly, providing humanitarian assistance presents additional challenges for military logisticians, and today's Air Force logistician must prepare for these challenges.



Chapter 1 - Today's Increasing Requirements

The global environment has radically changed since the end of the Cold War. For many years, as the worldwide humanitarian networks were still maturing, there were fewer direct requests for assistance from the superpowers. When the US Government (USG) received requests for humanitarian relief, countries mainly asked for assistance with major natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, and droughts. In places where the world's superpowers were not competing for influence, neutral members of the international community and surrogates of the superpowers typically managed humanitarian challenges.¹

Currently, America must take on a much greater role in providing humanitarian assistance. Complex contingencies involving conflict and humanitarian components have become more frequent, and such contingencies now make up the majority of the requests for US humanitarian relief.² In addition, dangerous

combinations of demographic, economic, and social forces mean that the need for military humanitarian assistance will continue to grow. Between 1990 and 2000, the total number of natural disasters such as wildfires, floods, and hurricanes increased worldwide from 650 to 850 per year.³ As further evidence of this trend, disasters occur today with four times more frequency, last longer, and cause more damage than in the 1980s.⁴

Department of Defense (DoD) leaders have emphasized the importance of military humanitarian assistance. Following the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, President George W. Bush said that challenges on the scale of Katrina now require a broader role for the Armed Forces in bringing to bear the "institution of our government most capable of massive logistical operations on a moment's notice."⁵ The ability to deliver humanitarian assistance effectively represents a key element



Air Force National Guard Forces Prepare to Provide Medical Support During Hurricane Rescue Operations

within the *National Security Strategy*. According to the *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*, the military's participation in humanitarian assistance permits the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism. This strategy says of humanitarian assistance that it contributes to winning the Global War on Terrorism by "demonstrating benevolence and goodwill abroad, reinforcing support for local governments, and mitigating problems that extremists exploit to gain support for their cause."⁶ Furthermore, the *Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept* states, "The Joint force ... will provide security, initial humanitarian assistance, limited governance, restoration of essential public services, and other reconstruction assistance."⁷

The Air Force currently has little formal written instruction pertaining to the unique aspects of humanitarian logistics.⁸ Nevertheless, the Air Force possesses many important capabilities that go beyond materiel support to relieve the results of natural or man-made disasters. The Air Force may airlift medical supplies, provide tents to refugees, or feed civilians in war-torn areas. The Air Force can rapidly respond with medical teams, civil engineers, and critically needed support to relieve immediate suffering and assist the host government at the start of a long-term reconstruction effort. Air mobility, security, communications, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and search and rescue forces, among others, can all significantly improve the ability of unilateral, Joint, and multinational organizations conducting humanitarian assistance missions.⁹

This handbook serves as a guide to help logisticians meet the growing demand on today's air and space expeditionary forces in performing foreign and domestic humanitarian missions. It combines current research and numerous references from Air Force and Joint doctrine as well as articles and lessons learned relating to humanitarian operations. This handbook can help prevent Air Force personnel from repeating past mistakes. It can also serve as a guide to ensure that the powerful capabilities that the Air Force possesses are brought to bear in humanitarian assistance missions with maximum effectiveness in alleviating human suffering.

The tactics, techniques, and procedures outlined in the chapters that follow are intended to guide a commander and staff in the planning and execution of humanitarian activities. The handbook is not all-encompassing, and is meant as a starting point for an Air Force member who is perhaps unexpectedly called upon to provide humanitarian assistance or disaster relief. This guide does not prescribe activities that are better addressed in other publications. See the references in Appendix E.

Chapter 2 - Operational Environment

Types of Missions

The Air Force may participate in many types of humanitarian missions including disaster relief, dislocated civilian support, security, technical assistance and support missions, consequence management, and humanitarian and civic assistance. A single combat or humanitarian assistance operation may contain more than one of these types of missions.^{10, 11}

Relief Missions

Relief missions, or disaster relief missions, refer to efforts to mitigate the consequences of natural or man-made disasters. Domestic and foreign disaster relief can result from a wide variety of causes—hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, oil spills, famine, and conflict. In response to disasters, the Air Force may be called upon to prevent the loss of life; alleviate suffering; protect property; provide food, water, and medical care; construct shelters; provide basic sanitation facilities; and repair public facilities.¹²

Many relief organizations such as the United Nations (UN) nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and international organizations [IO], already exist and possess the charters, expertise, and experience to conduct highly effective relief missions. In the absence of these organizations, or when they require additional support, the military conducts relief missions to provide *prompt aid* in alleviating the suffering of disaster victims.¹³

Dislocated Civilian Support Missions

Dislocated civilian support refers to missions designed to support the resettlement of refugees, migrants, stateless persons, evacuees, and internally displaced persons. The military's role may include: camp organization (construction and administration), provision of care (food, supplies, medical attention, and protection), and placement (movement or relocation to other countries, camps, and locations). In dislocated civilian support missions, the military force should begin by allocating DoD services and facilities to non-DoD agencies. The support force can then concentrate its resources on other humanitarian assistance efforts. Airmen working in logistics roles should anticipate that dislocated civilian support missions frequently have a long-term duration and require massive resourcing not readily available through DoD sources. Finally, DoD personnel should request guidance from the Department of State (DoS) to help Service members distinguish between a refugee and other types of dislocated civilians. Knowing this difference may have legal ramifications because refugees can receive special protection as they can no longer depend on the protection of their own country of nationality.¹⁴

Security Missions

A country decimated by a disaster may not have the capability to provide the necessary security to distribute aid. Security missions involve establishing and maintaining the conditions necessary to provide humanitarian assistance by organizations of the world relief community. Threats from the local population may mean that the successful delivery of relief supplies depends heavily on the protection of several aspects of a relief operation: transportation routes, warehouses, airports, seaports, personnel, and dislocated civilian shelters. When airmen conduct security missions, they should realize that once the lift of relief supplies begins, secure areas will be needed for the storage of relief materiel.¹⁵

Technical Assistance and Support Missions

Technical assistance and support missions refer to short-term tasks in a humanitarian mission that are of a technical nature, such as communications restoration, relief supply management, provision of emergency medical care, demining, and high priority relief supply delivery. The military may provide this assistance in the form of advice, selected training, assessments, manpower, and equipment. In foreign operations, the force commander should establish policy regarding technical advice and assistance (what assistance may be provided, as well as the source of authority for assistance) to the affected country and relief recipients as soon as possible.¹⁶

Consequence Management Missions

Consequence management missions mitigate the results of an intentional or accidental release of a weapon of mass destruction such as chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear materiel or high yield explosives. The mission may include providing transportation, communications, public works, fire fighting, information planning, care of mass casualties, resources support, essential or routine health and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materiel, food, and energy.¹⁷

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Missions

In contrast to other forms of humanitarian assistance (HA) which involve emergency relief, the Air Force conducts humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) as part of a long-term planned program of nation assistance. HCA operations may require logisticians to support medical, dental, veterinary care, construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems, well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities, and repair of public facilities. Federal law (Title 10 USC, Section 401) concerning HCA states the following.

- Must be carried out in conjunction with host nation (HN) military and civilian personnel

- Shall complement and may not duplicate any other form of social or economic assistance provided to the host nation by another department or agency of the US
- May not be provided directly or indirectly to any individual, group, or organization engaged in military or paramilitary activity
- May not be provided unless the DoS specifically approves such assistance¹⁸

Coordinating Organizations

International Relief Community

- **Nongovernmental Organization (NGO).** NGOs are private, self-governing, not-for-profit organizations dedicated to alleviating human suffering. They promote education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution. They also encourage the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.¹⁹ Examples of NGOs include Oxfam International and Doctors without Borders.²⁰
- **International Organization (IO).** IOs are organizations with global mandates and are generally funded by national governments.²¹ Examples of IOs include UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).²²
- **Private Voluntary Organization (PVO).** PVOs are tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations working in, or intending to become engaged in, international development activities. PVOs receive revenue from the private sector and voluntary contributions from the general public. Examples of PVOs include Catholic Relief Services and Save the Children.²³

The President and the National Security Council

Through the National Security Council, the President establishes US national security policy, which is then implemented by the agencies under his command. In addition, the Stafford Act states that the federal government must assist state and local governments in alleviating the suffering and damage resulting from major disasters and emergencies. Once the President declares a major disaster or emergency under this act, he may direct any agency of the federal government to undertake missions and tasks (on either a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis) in support of state and local agencies.²⁴

Department of Homeland Security

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leads the unified national effort to secure America by preventing and deterring terrorist attacks and protecting against and responding to threats and hazards to the nation.²⁵ Within the DHS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has the mission of




Figure 1. Model for Coordination Between Military and Nonmilitary Organizations - Domestic Civil Support ³⁰

leading the effort to prepare the nation for all hazards and effectively managing federal response and recovery efforts following any national incident.²⁶ FEMA sets up a disaster field office (DFO) in or near a disaster area to coordinate federal recovery activities with state, local, and DoD emergency management officials.²⁷ See Figure 1 for a sample chart that illustrates relationships.

Department of State

In US foreign HA operations, the ambassador within the affected country has overall responsibility for coordination. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and its parent organization, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), assists the embassy in coordinating and conducting operational assessments. Depending on the nature of the situation, OFDA may request logistics support, via the Secretary of State and the President, from the DoD. If the President approves the use of the DoD in support of the OFDA request, the regional combatant commander will provide military assistance.

OFDA. An agency within USAID, OFDA coordinates the total USG response to foreign disasters, performing needs assessment, and initiating necessary procurement of supplies, services, and transportation.²⁸ OFDA works closely with the international relief community, and OFDA has the authority to coordinate with the DoD. OFDA can deploy a disaster assistance response team (DART) into the crisis area to assist the HA coordination team.²⁹

Logisticians should coordinate military interactions with NGOs and PVOs via the US country team, particularly OFDA DART representatives.³¹ The *OFDA Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assistance and Response* provides useful information on transportation, communications, food, water, sanitation, emergency health treatments, and shelter parameters.³²

OFDA Coordination. To accomplish its mission, USAID/OFDA works closely with many NGOs, PVOs, and IOs: ICRC, International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) and Red Crescent Societies, United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA), UN Children's Fund, and United Nations World Food Program. OFDA also coordinates meetings with other governments responding to disasters to resolve operational and political problems. Because OFDA funds other relief organizations, OFDA may have the ability to expedite interventions in numerous ways.³³

Department of Defense

The Combatant Commander. The combatant commander (COCOM) has the responsibility to develop the strategic objectives required to transform national strategic policy and guidance into operational level activities for the HA crisis. To aid in the development of the HA plan, the COCOM may organize and deploy a humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST) to the operational area to acquire necessary intelligence. The COCOM may also create additional offices at his command to handle the extra requirements of an HA mission. These offices include a humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC), a logistics readiness center, and a liaison section. The COCOM may determine that further augmentation of forces with additional personnel is necessary. See Figure 2 for a sample chart that illustrates coordination relationships. Finally, the COCOM may determine that the HA operation requires the creation of a Joint task force (JTF). The JTF may work together with allies or foreign forces in a combined or multinational effort.³⁴ For more information on employing Joint forces, see JP 3-07.6, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.

Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team. The HAST deploys to the area of responsibility (AOR) to assess existing conditions

for the operation plan development. Before deploying, the HAST should receive a current threat assessment, current HA operations intelligence, geospatial information and services support, and embassy and DoS points of contact. The senior deploying commander should ensure that a pre-deployment vulnerability assessment has been conducted. The DoS DART and USAID mission can provide a great deal of this information. This topic is explained further in JP 3-07.6, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.

The HAST may have many responsibilities that include:

- Conducting reconnaissance to assess:
 - Available logistics facilities
 - Significant actors
 - The food and water supply
 - Loss of life, injury, and illness
 - Number of displaced persons
 - Disruption of the government
 - Presence of medical representatives
 - Status of communications and facilities
 - Destruction of property and infrastructure
- Establishing liaisons and coordinating assessments with host nation agencies, supported commanders or their representatives, US diplomatic personnel, and other relief agencies
- Formulating recommendations on HA missions and desired capabilities
- Coordinating with the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) in arranging for the reception of US personnel, supplies, and equipment
- Beginning HA missions to relieve suffering and life-threatening situations in emergency cases
- Determining the threat environment and surveying facilities capable of being used for self-defense of forces³⁶

Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC).

Normally a temporary body, the HACC assists with interagency planning and coordination. The HACC links governmental and nongovernmental agencies participating at the strategic theater level with the combatant command. If the HACC operates beyond the early planning and coordination stages, it normally becomes integrated into the JTF humanitarian operations center (HOC). Staffing of the HACC should include the following personnel.

- HACC director
- NGO advisor
- Civil-military operations planner
- OFDA advisor or liaison (if available)³⁷
- Legal advisor
- Public affairs officer
- Other augmentation as required³⁸

Logistics Operations Center. For the COCOM, the logistics operations center (LOC) serves as the point of contact for implementing a timely and flexible logistics response to an HA emergency. The LOC, if formed, serves to track and manage logistics needs of coalition forces while also coordinating

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logistics management and flow with other agencies in the operation. LOC responsibilities include management of the following:

- Alert key logistics agencies
- Locate and release required supplies
- Direct movement of supplies to departure airfields and seaports of embarkation
- Direct delivery of supplies and equipment to required locations
- Coordinate types of supplies and arrival times with other US and foreign agencies (often conducted by airlift in the early stages of response)
- Plan and coordinate aspects of force deployment and sustainment³⁹

Liaison Section. In conjunction with US operations, other nations might deploy military forces to operate with the JTF. Some coalition units may provide liaison elements at the COCOM as well as the JTF level.⁴⁰

Augmentation. It may be beneficial to augment the JTF with a group of experts from the COCOM staff. The COCOM may also tailor a deployable Joint task force augmentation cell (DJTFAC) to complement the JTF. A DJTFAC consists of experts in communications, coordination, logistics, planning, and public affairs.⁴¹

Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO). In domestic humanitarian assistance, United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) designates a defense coordinating officer (DCO) to coordinate DoD support to civilian agencies through the federal coordinating officer or principal federal official (PFO) at the disaster field office (DFO).⁴² United States Army North (USARNORTH), the Army component command of USNORTHCOM, has been tasked to support domestic civil authorities missions. As such, USARNORTH coordinates the activities of DCOs and their elements, which are assigned in each FEMA region.⁴³

Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). The Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIAG) is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander, the JIAG gives the COCOM the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments. The JIAG complements the strategic level interagency coordination that takes place through the National Security Council.⁴⁴

The Joint Task Force. The JTF provides personnel, equipment, and supplies to a disaster area. In domestic HA, the JTF works through the DCO to identify tasks, generate forces, prioritize assets against requirements, assist federal and private agencies, provide disaster response at the DFO, and support the local government based on FEMA mission assignments. It may be determined that, to eliminate duplication of effort and conserve scarce resources, a JTF should establish a Joint task force support command (JTFSC), Joint facilities utilization board (JFUB), and a Joint movement center (JMC). To coordinate the humanitarian relief effort, the JTF will likely create a civil-military operations center (CMOC) and, in foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), contribute personnel to a humanitarian operations center (HOC).⁴⁵

Joint Task Force Support Command (JTFSC). The JTFSC facilitates the process of setting theater logistics priorities. A JTFSC has a status as a separate JTF component (coequal to Air Force forces and Navy forces), which gives it the power to act as a broker between the other Services, thus improving overall efficiencies and economies of scale.⁴⁶

Joint Facilities Utilization Board. An HA operation can involve large numbers of coalition or US military forces potentially competing for real estate within the same geographical area. The JTF commander's logistics staff, J4, may form a Joint facilities utilization board (JFUB) in order to handle these issues most effectively. A JFUB acts as the executive agent to deconflict multiple user demands and recommend courses of action on unresolved issues pertaining to force accommodations, ammunition storage




Figure 2. Model for Coordination Between Military and Nonmilitary Organizations - Foreign Operations³⁵

points, Joint visitors bureau, postal facilities, transit facilities, and so forth.⁴⁷

Joint Movement Center. The Joint movement center (JMC) coordinates the employment of all means of transportation (including transportation available from allies or host nations)

to support the concept of operations.⁴⁸ Created by the COCOM, the JMC usually falls under the staff supervision of the senior logistics staff officer, and it supports the JTF by coordinating transportation with USTRANSCOM. The JMC oversees the execution of transportation priorities, plans movement

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operations, monitors the overall performance of the transportation system, and coordinates immediate transportation requirements.⁴⁹

Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). An important element for the success of a humanitarian mission, the CMOC coordinates and facilitates US and multinational forces' humanitarian operations with the efforts of international and local relief agencies, HN agencies, and HN authorities. In FHA, the CMOC works closely with relief agencies and other organizations, and an OFDA DART facilitates the civil-military interface.⁵⁰ The CMOC's primary function is receiving, validating, and coordinating requests for assistance (RFA) (for airlift, sealift) from relief agencies such as NGOs and the UN. See Figure 3 for the RFA flow process and Table 1 for a list of potential CMOC roles and responsibilities. In daily meetings, the CMOC identifies elements of the JTF that can fulfill these requests for assistance. Given the CMOC's roles and responsibilities, communication capabilities should be carefully prioritized with the CMOC in mind.⁵¹ For the sake of their donors and beneficiaries, relief agencies should ideally be given the best possible asset visibility throughout the RFA process. See Figure 4 for a sample CMOC organizational chart.

Humanitarian Operations Center. Normally established by the UN or a relief agency, the HOC develops and coordinates the overall relief strategy. In doing so, the HOC identifies logistics requirements for NGOs, the UN, and IOs. The HOC then identifies, prioritizes, and submits requests for military support to the CMOC. The HOC acts as an interagency policymaking body that does not exercise command and control. Instead, it seeks to achieve unity of effort among all of the disaster relief participants (host nation, the military, NGOs, the UN, and so forth).⁵⁵ The commander of the JTF may contribute personnel to an HOC. The HOC typically consists of a UN director with deputy directors from the JTF and OFDA DART. Representatives from the relief organizations form the standing liaison committee—the policymaking body of the HOC. HOC core groups and committees discuss ways to resolve issues on topics such as medical support, agriculture, water, health, and education.⁵⁶ See Figure 5 for a sample HOC organizational chart.

Types of Environments

In collaboration with other responding organizations, the US force commander assesses the operational environment with regard to the political situation, physical boundaries, threat to forces, global visibility, and media interest. This assessment will determine logistics requirements as they relate to the threat; however, airmen should remain watchful, as the HA environment can rapidly change.⁵⁸ Logisticians should never assume that even the most permissive looking environment will remain as such.⁵⁹ For

Screen, validate, and prioritize (based on DART advice) NGO, UN, and IO military support requests
Coordinate NGO, UN, and IO military support requests with military components
Act as an intermediary, facilitator, and coordinator between JTF elements and NGOs, UN, and IOs
Explain JTF (military) policies to NGOs, UN, and IOs, and explain NGO, UN, and IO policies to the JTF
Respond to NGO, UN, and IO emergency requests
Screen and validate NGO, UN, and IO requests for space available passenger airlift
Administer and issue NGO, UN, and IO identification cards (for access into military controlled areas)
Convene ad hoc mission planning groups when complex military support or numerous military units and NGOs, UN, and IOs are involved
Exchange JTF operations and general security information with NGOs, UN, and IOs, as required
Chair port, rail, and airfield committee meetings for space and access-related issues
Assist in the creation and organization of food logistic systems, when requested
Provide liaison between the JTF and HOC
Explain overall interagency policies and guidelines to the JTF and NGOs

Table 1. Potential CMOC Roles and Responsibilities⁵³

example, after Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans, the civilian population began firing weapons at military search and rescue teams. Logisticians should plan for the possibility of conflict since desperate beneficiaries can become belligerent.

Permissive Environment. In a permissive environment, commanders expect little or no opposition or resistance for the HA forces. A permissive environment promotes effective logistics in HA operations. Failure to distinguish between a permissive and hostile environment will result in inadequate planning and unrealistic expectations.⁶⁰ In a permissive environment, the host country military and law enforcement agencies have the control, intent, and capability to assist humanitarian assistance operations.⁶¹

Uncertain Environment. In an uncertain environment, host government forces do not have total control of the territory and population in the intended area of operation. The host nation government may also be either opposed or receptive to the HA operations.⁶²

Hostile Environment. In a hostile environment, hostile forces have control and the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to operations a unit intends to conduct, and military forces must prepare to operate in a full range of force protection contingencies.⁶³ The Air Force may conduct HA operations in a hostile environment in which the conditions, circumstances, and influences range from civil disorder or terrorist actions to full-scale combat. Logisticians must prepare for different and additional logistical needs that might result from a full range of contingencies such as defending the perimeter, providing escort convoys, screening the local populace, and assisting in personnel recovery operations.⁶⁴

A hostile environment possesses the following characteristics.

- Multiple conflicting parties.
- Imminent danger to all parties.
- Relief materiel used by combatants for political gain or social manipulation.
- Mission creep may divert resources from HA to combat service support.⁶⁵

Organizational Arrangements

The Air Force may participate in HA operations coordinated by the UN, a multinational coalition, or the US (unilaterally). Each of these arrangements can have important implications for Air Force logisticians. For example, the availability of funding sources or transportation assets may be unusual or unique. In any arrangement, civil-military relationships may very well serve as the critical enabler to mission success.⁶⁶

United Nations Coordinated Organizations

UN coordinated organizations refer to responses specifically organized and executed by UN forces.⁶⁷ Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has become more involved in worldwide HA missions. The UN may supply military forces for security and

monitoring of HA missions (as in the case of Somalia). While working toward a political consensus, the UN may respond slowly to a crisis, making a coalition or unilateral response faster. As a result, the US may begin an HA operation (in a unilateral or multinational command structure) and then turn it over to UN personnel.⁶⁸




Figure 3. Sample Request for Assistance Support Flow Process⁵²




Figure 4. Sample CMOC Organization⁵⁴




Figure 5. Humanitarian Operations Center Organizations⁵⁴

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Multinationally Coordinated Organizations

Multinationally coordinated organizations involve military forces and civilian agencies from more than one nation. There are three potential command relationships—lead nation, parallel, and regional alliance. In the lead nation option, the HA partners work under the command of a single nation. In the parallel option, multinational partners retain greater control of their own forces. In the regional alliance option, existing alliances form the basis for the forces.⁶⁹

Multinational operations usually coordinate large-scale HA responses. In these arrangements, clearly defined command relationships can determine the success or failure of the logistics response as well as the entire operation. Political goals of contributing nations can affect the command and control structure.⁷⁰

Multinational HA logistics possesses unique and difficult challenges for coordination. These challenges include language translation, cross-cultural sensitivities, and national perspectives. In multinational-led operations, planning should stress the establishment of essential liaison personnel.⁷¹ Traditional military rivals may have to cooperate, and language barriers may complicate matters. Extensive liaison support with partners (for example, NGOs, IOs, PVOs, as well as involved nations) will help reduce cultural barriers.

Unilaterally Coordinated Organizations

In unilateral operations, the US military works with the host nation in providing HA without the direct involvement of any other nation. A unilateral operation would normally occur when the mission requires expediency, as in the case of providing immediate airlift following a natural disaster. Unilaterally coordinated organizations may transition to become multinationally led organizations.⁷² In unilaterally coordinated operations, the US military will likely work in concert with other US government organizations such as USAID and FEMA.

For virtually every large-scale operation, more than one military service participates under a JTF organization. It should be remembered that within this JTF each Service possesses unique capabilities and capacities, which can vastly improve the overall response. For example, Operation Unified Assistance and Joint Task Force Katrina

Increase Awareness and encourage contact between the military and NGOs and IOs through symposia, meetings, briefings, and joint planning sessions.
Incorporate selected NGO and IO training into Service and joint training programs, and incorporate military training into NGO and IO training.
Review lessons learned in joint and Services' lessons learned databases.
Remember that NGOs and IOs may perceive the military as an inexhaustible resources reservoir thereby inundating the military with requests.
Many relief agencies may interpret equivocal responses such as "we'll try" as an affirmative response. Inability to provide support may adversely affect the civil-military relationship.
Be aware that not all NGOs and IOs appreciate military assistance or intervention.
Clearly articulate the role of the military and how it intends to interact with NGOs and IOs.
Recognize legal requirements and regulations that apply to relationships with NGOs and IOs.
Ensure that agreements and memorandums of understanding fully address funding considerations, delineate authority, and define negotiation channels.
Exchange NGO, IO, and military unit operating procedures and capabilities.
Ensure that CMOC officers are not perceived as favoring a particular relief organization, particularly at the expense of other organizations.
Consider acquiring a LNO from the NGO and/or IO community to be a part of the US force staff to help with such duties as coordination and planning.
Post information on the UN's ReliefWeb Internet site. The website is widely used by NGOs, IOs, and others to share and coordinate information.
Share logistic database information.

Table 2. Recommendations for Strengthening Civil-Military Unity of Effort ⁸⁰

benefited greatly from the other Services' ships, hovercraft, helicopters, and engineering personnel.⁷³

A single military service may also conduct HA operations and must therefore be capable of operating in a Joint, multinational, or interagency scenario. Furthermore, small units may serve as first responders and precursors to large-scale HA operations. Small-unit operations may include tasking of individual units for emergency medical support or short-term deployments of aircraft and personnel for quick-reaction transportation capabilities.⁷⁴

Civil-Military Partnerships

Significance

Mutually beneficial partnerships between the military and civilian organizations can substantially impact the success of the US military mission. In HA operations, the US military's role is to enable civilian agencies to perform their tasks.^{75,64} The Secretary of Defense may task US military forces to work closely with civilian organizations such as the UN, NGOs, and IOs. Creating an organizational framework for structured civil-military interaction, such as a CMOC, permits the military and civilian organizations to meet and work together while advancing common goals. It is crucial to remember that the role of such missions should be to enable, not perform, tasks.⁷⁶

The military should work closely with civilian organizations, especially with respect to logistics. The UN, NGOs, and IOs perform their own logistics assessments, and civilian organizations may have begun operating in the area long before the military arrives. These factors mean that civilian relief organizations may serve as excellent sources of information on the HA situation and challenges (defining food, water, and transportation requirements). Furthermore, the humanitarian relief community typically provides the bulk of the direct HA distribution at the grassroots level to the host populations, and NGOs and IOs will provide HA in areas of high risk, where other organizations will not go. Finally, the timing of termination may also depend upon successful transitioning of coordination to civilian relief agencies.⁷⁷

Coordination with Civilian Relief Agencies

Despite the need for a close working relationship, a unified civil-military partnership can be difficult to attain. Coordination with relief organizations is challenging. For example, civilian aid organizations frequently do not employ a rigid chain of command. They usually favor a decentralized organization. Secondly, NGOs, IOs, and the UN may not fully appreciate military assistance in HA operations. Aid workers may not understand or may be confused about the nature and motives of the responding military force. In addition, civilian relief organizations often have neutrality mandates that prevent them from collaborating with armed forces. These neutrality mandates help prevent their beneficiaries from

inadvertently viewing the aid organizations as adversaries. Making matters even more challenging, numerous organizations can become involved in the relief effort, which can inherently undermine unity of effort.⁷⁸

Considering the many challenges of coordinating with civilian relief agencies during HA, relationships with these organizations need to be based on a mutual understanding in areas concerning lines of communications, support requirements, procedures, information sharing, capabilities, and most importantly, missions. The American Council for Voluntary International Action, a consortium of over 150 private agencies operating in 180 countries, can facilitate coordination. The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs can also help with coordination efforts.⁷⁹ Finally, Table 2 lists specific recommendations to help strengthen the unity of effort.



New Orleans Residents Evacuate During Hurricane Katrina

Chapter 3 - Logistics Considerations

Often, HA operations demand creative and nontraditional logistics solutions to unique problems. Logistics support during HA needs to be responsive and effective while at the same time having a reduced *footprint* of forward-deployed logistics elements. Emphasis on compact and multiuse equipment, increased dependability, less redundancy, and the ability to reliably reach back for support are all central to effective logistics.⁸¹

Lessons learned indicate that logistics requirements in foreign humanitarian assistance are frequently underestimated. As a result, care should be taken throughout the operation that the overall logistics concept is closely tied to the operational strategy and that logistics and operations elements are mutually supportive.⁸²

Operational Level Considerations

Open the Base

Funding Authority. Funding the logistics of an HA operation can quickly become one of the most significant challenges for commanders. Expenses accrue rapidly, and commanders must therefore address the legal authority, mechanisms, and constraints that affect the Air Force in acquiring and disbursing supplies and services.

The Air Force normally receives reimbursement for expenses in HA missions as long as certain criteria are met. Refer to AFI 10-802, *Military Support to Civil Authorities*, for specific guidelines and legal criteria.

USAID/OFDA coordinates payment of such expenses when it requests DoD actions; however, the DoD must coordinate with USAID/OFDA in advance of any funds expenditures. Without prior USAID/OFDA coordination (or if Air Force costs exceed USAID/OFDA resources), replacing resources requires congressional action.

Logistics Assessments. Logistics assessments during HA operations require an integrated approach including host nation and theater support capabilities. Assessments should include inputs from the civilian relief community. When operating in remote and austere locations, the deployment of materiel handling equipment and communication assets becomes a high priority. Area assessments, or studies, serve as a key element in planning the logistics in HA operations. Area assessments include information about the area of operations such as logistics, politics, culture, economy, geography, and weather. Area assessments should attempt to focus on the underlying causes of problems. Information obtained from news agencies can also be a valuable source of intelligence.

Pre-Deployment Planning Considerations.⁸³ Identify time-phased materiel, resources, facilities, and other resources necessary to support the current operation. Establish thorough

methods to identify and prioritize cargo increments, especially non-DoD cargo, to ensure transportation control.⁸⁴

- Determine logistics planning factors to be used for the operation and development of logistics requirements. Additionally, define the method to determine sources for all classes of supply.
- Identify support methods and procedures required to meet the air, land, and sea lines of communication.
- Provide for coordinating and controlling movements in the HA area of operations to adjust the materiel flow commensurate with the throughput capability.
- Describe the interrelationship between theater and strategic LOCs, to include the need for airfields capable of supporting strategic and theater airlift aircraft. Develop a country or theater concept of support.
- Develop a plan to provide food, equipment, and medical supplies to relieve suffering in the absence of NGOs, PVOs, and IOs.
- Airmen in logistics roles should also prepare for and remain aware of cultural differences integral to international HA. Airmen should avoid imposing ethnocentric standards on a group that resists these standards. For example, airmen may encounter cultures that may refuse certain types of food, even in disaster situations.
- The COCOM J4 should consider contracting for support capabilities to resolve critical supplies, services, and real estate concerns. Contracting support can come from within the host nation or from outside the country. If support is contracted from inside the country, the country logistical resources should be able to support the country first and then the military requirements.
- Security of personnel, supplies, and equipment is paramount. Plan in advance for the worst-case scenario during warehousing and distribution.⁸⁵

Locating Logistics Bases. Factors such as safety and security may significantly affect the location of logistics bases. However, military leaders should attempt to establish logistics bases as close as possible to the relief recipients.⁸⁶ Close proximity of logistics bases creates numerous benefits such as faster and more accurate assessments and reduced lag time in distribution of supplies. In addition, close proximity of logistics bases can help prevent population movements that might diminish the social and economic support systems of the beneficiaries.

Command and Control

Commander's Principal Concerns. The following outlines key concerns.

- Do not make the problem worse. Initial groups of personnel should be self-sustaining (have food, water, medical, and shelter) to last until either military support units arrive or

commercial services resume. All combat service support areas of the responding unit must be considered (supply, transportation, maintenance, general engineering, health services, and services).

- Publicize the desired end state to all participants early to avoid unreasonable expectations and mission growth.⁸⁷ Have a transition plan. Include the intended scope and duration of military involvement.
- Civilian organizations should contribute to the operation with all available assets as they arrive in the AOR, facilitating rapid transition away from reliance on military aid.⁸⁸
- Commanders should keep careful control over personnel to provide accountability and safety. For additional considerations, see Table 3.⁸⁹

Organizational Preparedness. Commanders must prepare forces for unique HA operations, and they must also anticipate equipping and training needs. In-theater precrisis training and periodic training directly enhances HA operational effectiveness. The command and control organization, especially logisticians, must prepare to coordinate with many nonmilitary groups including the OFDA, part of the USAID that manages foreign disaster assistance; FEMA, part of the DHS that manages domestic disaster assistance; and UN agencies (the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, World Food Programme, PVOs, NGOs, and IOs).

The success of the logistics and overall HA operation depends heavily on effective situational awareness from information and intelligence sources. The command and control organization must additionally prepare for the challenges involved in gathering, processing, and disseminating information in an HA environment.

Media Coverage.⁹⁰ Airmen should anticipate extensive media coverage of HA operations. Commanders at all levels, government agencies, the public at large, and others may use media reports to gauge the success of the mission. Airmen should facilitate media coverage, through the public affairs officer, to the maximum extent possible. Media events can assist the HA

Visa requirements
Border crossing points
Customs clearance of staff carrying specialized equipment
Legal status of personnel
Arrival times clearly designated as GMT (zulu) and local time
Compatible communications equipment between HQ and field
Security situation, evacuation plans, and personnel accountability

Table 3. Personnel Considerations

Chapter 3 - Logistics Considerations

mission and support US national objectives. Airmen involved in HA logistics should not seek to control the media, but instead to understand the impact supporting the media will have on HA operations. For example, media personnel may supplant intended cargo space for relief items. Planning in advance for these additional logistics demands can ensure that operational objectives are still met.

Tactical Level Considerations

The tactics, techniques, and procedures outlined below are intended as a guide for planning and execution of HA activities. They are not all-encompassing, and should be used as a starting point. See Appendix E for a list of publications that specifically address HA activities.

In general, two questions will dictate the scope and magnitude of operations:⁹¹

- What is preventing people from obtaining aid from traditional sources?
- What are the needs of the population that only the military can satisfy?

Establish the Base

- Logistics planning, command, and control.
 - Emphasis must be placed upon locating logistics bases as close as possible to the recipients. Logistics planners should avoid locating distribution points in major population centers to reduce the influx of affected populations from outlying, traditional economic and social areas.⁹²
 - Planning must include logistics support that normally is outside the bounds of military logistics, such as support to the civilian populace (women, children, and the aged). Civil-military operations forces often are going to provide support for these categories of individuals. Planners must take appropriate steps early on to ensure proper aid is administered.
 - Planning should consider the potential requirements to provide support to nonmilitary personnel, such as NGOs and international organizations.
 - Clearly identify higher commander's specified and implied tasking.⁹³
 - Begin communications with other responders.⁹⁴
 - Establish a 24-hour command and control hub.
 - Quickly develop a network of contacts with functional counterparts.
 - Utilize media outlets and public affairs functions.⁹⁵
 - At the earliest opportunity, obtain host nation permission to operate aircraft and watercraft.
 - Determine what information is vital, what method is best to obtain this information, and how much detail is necessary for it to be useful.⁹⁶
 - Gather intelligence and analyze: political, legal, military, and cultural limitations; physical (topographical, infrastructure) obstacles; manpower and materiel as part of the total response force (manpower and materiel may include other Services, agencies, host nation, and NGOs); and information or capability gaps that may be critical to mission success. In addition, other organizations may be able to provide additional intelligence. Scrutinize the source and quality of data to prevent inflated requests⁹⁷ and to ensure relevance to the operation. Determine whether it is part of the emergency or a chronic need.⁹⁸
 - Determine primary and alternate fuel sources.⁹⁹
 - Review lessons learned for other similar operations.¹⁰⁰
 - Military response to humanitarian crises is very similar to other short-notice deployments. Refer to the *Agile Combat Support Concept of Operations* for more information on the building block approach to operations.¹⁰¹
 - Seek out subject matter experts from recent operations or exercises.¹⁰²
 - Other responding organizations (OFDA DART, UN, IFRC, and others) may have information you can use to boost situational awareness. Tapping into their networks may save valuable time and effort (data quality may be an issue).¹⁰³

- Give special consideration to employing units which can *jump-start* the supply pipeline or provide unique capabilities other organizations cannot provide (search and rescue, chaplain, mortuary affairs, and others).¹⁰⁴

Generate the Mission

Contracting can be an effective force multiplier of combat service support for deployed forces. Logisticians should be thoroughly familiar with contracting options available through the Navy's Emergency Construction Capabilities Contract Process, the Army's Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program, the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program, acquisition cross service agreements, or HNS resources. Contracting can bridge gaps that may occur before sufficient organic support units can deploy, or it can be used to reduce the logistics footprint. Above all, military forces should not compete for scarce civilian resources.¹⁰⁵ The COCOM LOC deconflicts multiple requirements for contracts.

Logisticians should consider all potential sources of supplies. Sources may include the affected country, commercial, multinational, and prepositioned supplies.¹⁰⁶ Materiel and equipment should be purchased or leased as close to the affected country as possible to reduce the cost of transportation and the time needed for delivery. Items not available in country should be purchased from neighboring countries in an *expanding ring* around the affected country. Heavy construction equipment and other vehicles should be leased whenever possible.¹⁰⁷

- The primary role of military contracting personnel is to provide supplies and services for military units, not for the affected population.
 - Other organizations are better suited to providing standardized, acceptable aid through their previously established supply chains.
 - Without precise specifications and advice from assessment teams, the wrong items and services could be purchased.
- Develop a means to write, approve, and fund contracts expeditiously.
 - Contracts should be written to facilitate easy exit of military forces and emphasize short-term transition to follow-on organizations.
 - Ensure currency requirements for customs and immigration fees are fully understood for all ports of entry into the host nation. Logistics expeditors mobilized to ports of entry must have immediate availability of all funds necessary to maintain an unrestricted flow of supplies, equipment, and personnel.¹⁰⁸
- Materiel and services should be purchased from local vendors.
 - Local vendor contracting eliminates international transport costs, conserves airlift and manpower, provides familiar goods to the population, boosts the local economy, and buys time for larger stocks to arrive.¹⁰⁹
 - Local and regional transporters and freight forwarders can be contracted to provide logistics services. They have valuable knowledge of local regulations, procedures, and facilities and can help ensure compliance with the laws of

the host country as well as expediting delivery operations.¹¹⁰

- Local points of contact, to include construction supervisors and freight forwarders, should have reasonable command of the English language, both spoken and written. Contacts at ports should immediately report all encountered delays to the transportation manager at the main operating location in order to speed resolution of any difficulties.¹¹¹ Make allowances for potential additional costs, errors, and delays if interpreters are employed.
- Ensure contracts include the following stipulations:¹¹²
 - Purchase contracts should provide for delivery-linked payments, the return of damaged goods, and penalties for any deviations in fulfillment of the contract, other than in situations of armed conflict.
 - Transporters and handling agents should assume total liability for food commodities in their care and reimburse any losses.
 - Ensure fair competition, transparency, and the utmost accountability when administering contracts.¹¹³
 - For more contracting considerations, refer to the *CARE Food Aid Logistics Operational Handbook*¹¹⁴ and the *World Food Programme Emergency Field Operations Pocketbook*.¹¹⁵

Operate the Base

- Supply
 - In cases where the Air Force plays a supporting role:
 - Storage areas for transient cargo should be:
 - Secured or limited access for accountability purposes.
 - Appropriate temperature for sensitive medicines or foods.
 - Protected from rodent and insect infestation.
 - Protected from fire or weather hazards.
 - Accessible for materiel handling equipment (MHE) to load trucks for onward disbursement.
 - Have communications capability for documentation and tracking.
 - Identify sources for pallets, tri-wall containers, packaging and banding, shrink wrap, cargo nets, and so forth.
 - Determine if personnel should be armed in the event that the host nation cannot secure warehouses or working areas.¹¹⁶
 - In cases where the Air Force is lead agency, take these actions in addition to supporting role duties:
 - Immediately request survival packs to include water source, food, blankets, plastic sheeting, and lumber based on initial area assessments.
 - Establish DoD activity address code for the site to enable financial mechanisms.
 - View Appendix A for more supply infrastructure considerations.
 - If necessary, refer to the *Air Force Refugee Camp Planning and Construction Handbook*.¹¹⁷ Since this

Chapter 3 - Logistics Considerations

activity is not a distinctive capability for Air Force units, seek combatant commander's guidance.

- Transportation
 - While airlift is an expensive distribution mode, it is good for delivering aid to remote, isolated populations or for high priority, time-sensitive cases.
 - Receiving prioritization guidance is key to managing port workload.
 - To conserve airlift for high-priority missions, utilize waterborne, road, or rail modes of distribution whenever possible.
 - Address problems with infrastructure and facilities impeding relief efforts.¹¹⁸
 - Calculate throughput limitations due to manpower and MHE. Request MHE as required to support operations and overcome limitations. Develop means to unload B-747, DC-10, and other high-door aircraft.
 - Plan on transporting supplies for the host nation, other agencies, and NGOs.¹¹⁹
 - Address any legal or security issues early in planning.
 - Seek guidance on how to prioritize cargo and passengers.
 - Integrate flight operations into existing air traffic control rules and routes. Establish and publish rules if none are in effect.¹²⁰
 - Carefully consider aircraft parking (especially tarmac weight limits) and cargo storage capability of airfields when requesting or scheduling aid.
 - Taskings for distinguished visitors and media transport may affect available aircraft.¹²¹ Often an additional aircraft will be kept on standby, which initially reduces the fleet, but may prove useful in last-minute taskings.
 - Distinguished visitors often travel with an entourage of security, support staff, and associated baggage. Media will carry bulky equipment, particularly after large-scale disasters. Weigh the benefits of using aircraft for these missions versus relief missions and plan accordingly.
 - Carefully screen for hazardous materiel in donated shipments.
 - Carefully document shipments via bills of lading and waybills through the chain of custody.

Improper packaging
Congestion at the port of entry and other nodes
Customs delays due to inadequate documentation
Theft and pilferage
Losses due to inadequate storage or inadequate protective measures
Losses from lack of insurance coverage
Materiel handling delays
Competition for local transport assets
Bottlenecks in the transport system
Donated shipments arrive unmarked or lack a specific point of contact or consignee
Unexpected cargo arrives at the port and is consigned to the emergency services of the affected nation, which may or may not be capable of distributing it
The unrequested cargo may consist of inappropriate goods, promoting greater port congestion and diverting staff from important tasks to remove or dispose of it

Table 4 Potential Problem Areas ¹²³

Phase I. A UN command is established or the host nation government is prepared to begin assuming responsibility for relief missions.
Phase II. Staff elements of UN or host nation familiarize themselves with the mission, the relief effort, and general situation. The UN begins assuming duties and responsibilities of the JTF. Command and control is established and functioning.
Phase III. Commander of UN forces or host nation government able to assume functions of the JTF. All nonessential US forces are withdrawn from the area.

Table 5. Transition Plan Phases ¹²⁴



Deploying to Support Hurricane Rescue Operations

- Properly documented shipments help donor agencies maintain accountability of supplies delivered.
- Stress to contributors that accurate shipping information is crucial to customs clearance, including indications on which cargo increments will remain in the affected country.¹²²
- To the extent possible, document shipments and schedules via unclassified means to simplify communications with other responders.
- Have a control plan for shipments on 463L pallets to prevent losing pallets, nets, and dunnage.

See Appendix A and Table 4 for more transportation infrastructure considerations.

Transition and Termination

Transition consists of the transfer of responsibilities and functions such as logistics to another organization such as a component of the JTF, the host nation, or the UN upon meeting objectives and receiving authorization. A transition plan aids in identifying transition issues. A transition plan should include the organization of the forces, operating procedures, and any other transition recommendations and considerations for the transitioning parties.

The transition plan should identify task force organization, operating procedures, and transition recommendations and

considerations. In implementing the transition plan, the transitioning parties should discuss criteria for transferring operations. The plan should be unclassified, clear, and concise, without military jargon. One method of transitioning is by function. Another method is by locale. If possible, the transition process should be event-driven and not tied to calendar dates. For example, functions or areas would only transfer when a similar capability becomes available or is no longer needed. Procedures for transfer of equipment or supplies, either between components of the JTF or with the UN or host nation, must be determined. JTF planners must identify fiscal guidance, reconstitution of assets, and availability and use of operations and maintenance funds. To track the progress of the transition process, a series of criteria may be developed as illustrated by the Transition Plan Phases from Operation Restore Hope in Table 5.

Supplies and equipment left behind as a result of HA support operations must be in accordance with all applicable Federal laws and statutes relating to the donation or transfer of military articles and supplies. Consult legal counsel prior to any release of supplies and equipment.¹²⁵ Government property to be transferred to NGO or refugee groups after camp construction must be accurately inventoried, so its value may be computed and provided to the legal community for transfer documentation.¹²⁶

Visit the *Journal* online at: <http://www.afjma.hq.af.mil/lgj/Afjlhome.html>

Chapter 4 - Today's Logistics Challenge

While humanitarian assistance has increasingly become a required area of proficiency for the Air Force, leadership in this mission continues to remain highly challenging. In 2005, logisticians from Operation Unified Assistance stated that humanitarian assistance operations

presented extra challenges not typically found in combat as a result of the urgency of planning, ambiguous command and control, and difficulty in communicating with numerous organizations both inside and outside of the DoD. According to AFIT School of Systems and Logistics research, the most common



US Air Force C-17s Unloading Cargo for Humanitarian Support Operations



Meeting the Challenge of Humanitarian Assistance—Military and Civilian Responders Assist Evacuees

Lessons learned from recent humanitarian actions (including the Southeast Asian Tsunami and Hurricane Katrina relief operations) reveal the following.

- Poor coordination
- Lack of information sharing
- Inadequate education and training
- Inconsistent processes
- Logistical capacity limitations impeded the logistics responsiveness of military missions

Clearly, providing humanitarian assistance presents additional challenges for military logisticians, and today's Air Force logistician must prepare for these challenges.

Appendix A - Infrastructure Checklist¹²⁷

Airports

- Identify the airport being assessed
 - Name
 - Designator
 - Location
 - Elevation
- Describe the current condition of facilities
- Ascertain whether the airport is fully operational
- Obtain information on usable runway lengths and locations
- Determine whether taxiways, parking areas, and cargo handling areas are intact and can meet the anticipated demands of the operation
- Establish whether runway and approach lights are operating
- Specify which navigational aids are operating
- Describe available communications facilities
- Determine whether the terminal building is operating
- Check the availability and cost of aviation fuel, refueling vehicles, and total refueling capacity
- Find out if facilities exist for mandatory aircrew rest
- Explore whether the cargo handling area can be lit for night cargo operations
- Determine what cargo handling equipment is available, including fuel, and operators
 - Forklifts (number, capacity)
 - Scissors lift (capacity)
 - Cargo dollies (number)
 - Trucks with drivers and laborers for hand unloading
- Determine what startup equipment is available, including ground power units, fuel, and operators
- Describe maintenance operations (facilities, personnel, hours)
- Outline what storage is available:
 - Covered
 - At the airport
 - Off airport
 - How far away
 - Capacity and suitability for storage of foods or other perishables

Civil Aviation

- Find out whether arrangements can be made for prompt overflight and landing clearances
- Ascertain that the air controller service is functioning and hours of operation

- Explore having *no objections* fees or *royalty* fees waived or paid locally
- Find out if arrangements can be made to work around the clock, including customs
- Identify personnel to tally and document cargo when received and transshipped
- Ascertain if the host government will accept deliveries by means of military as well as civilian aircraft
- Describe security arrangements
- Determine what repairs and auxiliary equipment would be needed to increase airport capacity
- Determine if any local air carriers exist and their availability and rates

Alternative Aircraft

- Identify any usable airports or suitable helicopter landing sites in the disaster zone
- Determine the local availability and cost of helicopters or fixed wing aircraft
- Estimate capacity
- Identify the owners and agents
- Determine the availability and cost of fuel

Warehousing

- Identify undamaged or damaged but usable warehouses located in reasonable proximity to the disaster site
- Determine the capacity of these warehouses
- Determine their availability over a specific period of time
- Specify whether the warehouses are government-owned, UN/PVO/NGO/IO-owned, or privately owned
- Determine whether they are staffed
- Determine the cost per square meter
- Assess the adequacy of warehouse construction
 - Ventilation
 - Lighting
 - Hard floor
 - Fireproofing
 - Loading docks
- Condition of roof (check during day)
- Describe available loading and unloading equipment
 - Pallets
 - Forklifts and fuel

- Ascertain that adequate security exists:
 - Perimeter fence
 - Lighting
 - Guards
- Determine whether any refrigeration is available
- Determine whether sorting and repackaging facilities exist
- Determine whether fumigation is necessary and if the warehouse is available for food, medicines, and so forth
- If assessing a functioning warehouse, determine:
 - Accounting and recordkeeping procedures
 - Bin/stock cards on piles (They must match the warehouse register.)
 - Physical inventory checks at random intervals
 - Use of waybills
 - Stacking methods
 - Spacing system between rows
 - Cleanliness
 - Commodity handling system
 - Reconstitution of damaged goods
 - Prompt disposal of damaged goods
 - First-in and first-out system



Reservists Clearing Roads of Debris During Hurricane Katrina

Appendix B - General Capacities

Information contained in this section is provided for reference purposes. Department of Defense and Air Force directives will take precedence always.

Aircraft Type	Pallet Positions	Cargo STON		Passengers ^{4,6}		Standard NEO Passengers
		ACL ²	Planning ³	ACL	Planning	
C-130	6	17	12	90	80	92/74 ⁵
C-17	13	30	19	153	120	200/153 ⁵
C-5	36	89	61.3	73	51	73
KC-10	23	60	32.6	75	68	75
KC-135	6	18	13	53	46	53
A-330	-	-	-	240	240	266
A-300-600	15	79	69	-	-	-
B-747	34	113	98	315	315	380
B-757	15	38	33	125	125	220
B-767	24	67	58	190	190	235
B-777	-	-	-	246	246	320
DC-8	16	40	35	-	-	-
DC-10-10	30	40	35	175	175	350
DC-10-30	30	79	69	242	242	350
L-1011	26	48	42	180	180	335
MD-11	34	98	85	267	267	300

Notes:

1. Cargo and passenger payloads (except for the C-5) are exclusive of each other.
2. Organic (except C-130) calculated as the maximum ACL for a 3,200 nautical mile leg, CRAF calculated for a 3,500 nautical mile leg. C-130 calculated based on a 2,000 nautical mile leg.
3. CRAF based on mixed Service averages (B-747-100 Eq = 78 STON)
4. CRAF maximum and average passengers are the same because passengers are loaded to the maximum allowable by weight.
5. Lower NEO number reflects life raft capacity.
6. Weights are based on 400 lbs per passenger, which includes passenger, baggage, and combat gear. Take total passenger weight into account as part of total cargo weight when requirements dictate movement of cargo and passengers on the same aircraft.

Aircraft Payloads¹²⁸ (See Note 1)

Motor Asset Description	Cargo Characteristics		
	Length (in)	Width (in)	Weight (lbs)
Commercial semitrailer, flatbed, 40-foot	480	96	48,000
M1070, heavy equipment transporter, HET	420	120	140,000

Note: Boldface type indicates that overhang is allowed

Motor Asset Capacity for Surface Movements¹²⁹



Offloading Cargo During Humanitarian Operations in Banda Aceh After the 2004 Tsunami.



Military Truck Support During Hurricane Katrina

Appendix B - General Capacities

Eligible Cargo Capacity	Interior			Capacity STON
	Length (in)	Width (in)	Height (in)	
20-foot container	232	90	92 ¹	23.5
40-foot flatrack	462	102	126	25.0 ²
Quadraple Container	90	53	74 ³	4.0

Notes:

1. Door height is 89 inches
2. Assumes flatrack is lifted. Capacity when used as a false deck is 67.2 STON.
3. Door height is 70 inches

Container Capacities¹³⁰

Rail Asset Description	Cargo Characteristics			
	Length (in)	Width (in)	Height (in)	Weight (lbs)
60-foot rail flatcar	648	124	-	150,000
68-foot DODX rail flatcar	744	125	-	299,000
89-foot rail flatcar	996	102	-	110,000
89-foot rail bi-level car - Level 1	1,004	100	84	40,000
- Level 2	1,004	100	114	40,000
KS, Light European railcar	492	109	-	59,500
RS, Medium European railcar	728	104	-	124,400
RMMS, Medium European railcar	498	114	-	130,000
RES, Medium European railcar	728	104	-	124,500
SAMMS, Heavy European railcar	590	122	-	143,200
KRN 40T, Korean 42-foot flatcar	504	102	-	80,000
KRN 50T, Korean 50-foot flatcar	588	114	-	108,000
KRN 50W, wide Korean 49-foot car	588	132	-	108,000
KRN 63T, Korean deepwell flatcar	252	125	-	126,000
KRN 70T, Korean deepwell flatcar	630	144	-	154,000

Note: Boldface type indicates that overhang is allowed

Rail Asset Capacity for Surface Movements¹³¹

Ship Type	Average Usable Cargo Space (sq ft) ¹	Average TEU Capacity (Weather Deck) ²	Average TEU Capacity (Below Deck) ²	Average TEU Capacity (All Container Sockets) ²
LMSR – All	280,361	128	209	337
LMSR – Conversion	233,969	63	216	279
LMSR – New Construction	292,733	146	207	353
Fast Sealift Ship	152,774	184	46	230
Auxiliary Crane Ship	9,224 ³	240	364	604
Breakbulk	48,625	-	-	-
Non-Self-Sustaining Container Ship	-	-	-	2,718
Self-Sustaining Container Ship	-	-	-	1,763
Notional Roll-On/Roll-Off	117,668	459	-	459

Notes:

1. Assumes 25 percent broken stowage without containers loaded.
2. Reduces the average usable cargo space.
3. Cargo space on main deck without containers.

Ship Characteristics Used for Sealift Movement¹³²

Asset	Planning Load Weight	Passengers
Landing Craft, Air Cushioned ¹	75 STON max/overload or	24
Landing Craft, Utility ¹	143 STON or	400
UH-60L "Blackhawk" helicopter ²	9,000lbs external 2,640lbs internal or	11
CH-47D "Chinook" helicopter ²	26,000lbs external center hook 19,500lbs internal or	33
Notes:		
1. Refer to US Marine Corps, <i>Amphibious Ships and Landing Craft Data Book</i> , (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 29 August 2001), 29-30.		
2. Refer to US Army Fact File at http://www.army.mil/fact_files_site/aircraft.html accessed 21 November 2006.		

Other Transportation Asset Characteristics



Offloading an AIRBUS *Beluga* Specialized Aircraft

Appendix C - Legal Authority

DoD approval for HA missions rests with the President and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). The DoS requests DoD capabilities for foreign disasters, and the DHS requests DoD capabilities for domestic disasters. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), by the authority and at the direction of the SECDEF, can then order deployments. HA commanders should remain aware of appropriate national and international directives, mandates, resolutions, or other documents related to the HA mission.

Achieving success in an HA operation requires HA forces to exercise authority in accordance with international and domestic laws. HA forces must understand and act according to the interests, prerogatives, and authority of numerous levels of civil government and agencies involved in HA.

Law of Armed Conflict¹³³

DoD policy is to apply law of armed conflict principles in every military operation, regardless of how that operation is characterized. See DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5500.17, *Department of Defense Law of War Program*. Specific legal responsibilities associated with armed conflict that may directly influence FHA operations include physical care for civilians or noncombatants, property issues, and law enforcement responsibilities. In most cases, there will be specific HN or US legal provisions applicable to the situation. Many issues may confront the commander that will not be governed by the Geneva Conventions. Therefore, the commander should consult with the staff judge advocate (SJA) for legal advice on how to address these issues. *Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 1-14M*, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*, *AFPD 51-4*, *Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict*, *Air Force Handbook 10-222 Volume 22*, *Refugee Camp Planning and Execution Guide*, and *Field Manual 27-10*, *The Law of Land Warfare*, provide detailed guidance for many of these issues.

FHA Forces

Members of FHA forces remain subject to applicable national laws, policies, and regulations of their own nations, including military criminal codes. All US military personnel remain subject to the *Uniform Code of Military Justice* which will be administered by the appropriate military commander. JFCs are responsible for the discipline and administration of personnel assigned to the Joint organization, and may be delegated courts-martial authority by the combatant commander or the Secretary of Defense. In addition to the administration and disciplinary authority exercised by subordinate JFCs, a combatant commander may prescribe procedures by which the senior officer of a military service assigned to the headquarters element of a

Joint organization may exercise administrative and nonjudicial punishment authority over personnel of the same military service assigned to the same Joint organization. Absent international agreement provisions to the contrary, members of FHA forces also are subject to HN law and to actions in HN criminal and civil courts. Therefore, commanders must ensure that Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) are in place before any forces are deployed to the area of operations. More detailed information may be found in JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, and the *Manual for Courts-Martial*.

Status-of-Forces Agreements

A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) defines the legal status of a military force when deployed in the territory of a friendly state. A SOFA does not itself authorize the presence or activities of those forces. The purpose of a SOFA during FHA operations is to define how the sending and receiving states will share their sovereign prerogatives. SOFAs seek to define the rights, immunities, and duties of the force and its members. If no treaty or SOFA exists with the affected country, the Department of Defense must become involved in establishing the status of US forces. Authority to negotiate and conclude SOFAs must be obtained from the DoS under its Circular 175 Procedure (*11 FAM 720 Negotiation and Conclusion*). In cases where time or circumstances do not permit the negotiation of a full SOFA, adequate protection for US forces may be obtained by an exchange of diplomatic notes between the United States and the HN. The DoS will have the lead for this action. Department of Defense Directive 5530.3, *International Agreements*, provides guidance regarding the negotiation and conclusion of SOFAs.

Legal Status of UN Volunteers

United Nations volunteers (UNVs) are not UN *staff* members and as such are not subject to UN staff rules and regulations. They are persons who are performing functions or assignments for the UN under a contract of employment and are considered *agents* of the UN. The International Court of Justice's 11 April 1949 advisory opinion established the need for agent protection as a condition of satisfactory duty performance. UNVs are under UN protection and enjoy some of the privileges and immunities accorded to UN staff officials. The 1946 Conventions on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations specify that the privileges and immunities are granted in the interest of the UN organizations and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. The organizations must cooperate at all times with the authorities of members to facilitate the administration of justice and secure the observance of law to prevent occurrence of any abuse in connection with privileges and immunities. UNVs

are similar to UN staff members in that they are immune from legal action with respect to words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity. In general, they are exempt from taxation by the nation in which performing UNV duties, if different than the nation of citizenship. They are also exempt from national service obligations. The United Nations Development Program resident representative is responsible for all arrangements relating to the security and protection of UNVs under the international instruments applicable to the UN and to its employees. When supporting the UN, US personnel may be entitled to expert-on-mission status under the 1946 *Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations*. This status provides some protection from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the HN. Commanders and legal advisers should be familiar with *The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel*.

Legal Status of NGOs

No legal regime governs the status and activities of NGOs. Except for the regionally oriented Convention of the Council of Europe, no international convention grants NGOs legal personality or authority in the territories of States. NGOs have a national legal status corresponding to the country in which each was established and is recognized. Their national government authorities and those of the affected country are the source of protection for them and their personnel and volunteers.

Internally Displaced Persons and Human Rights Law

Human rights law is the principal source of protection for internally displaced persons. Unlike refugee law which only applies when a border is crossed, human rights law proclaims broad guarantees for the fundamental rights of all persons. The *International Bill of Human Rights*, composed of the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” the “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” and the “International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,” forms the main body of human rights law. These instruments guarantee a series of rights applicable to situations experienced by internally displaced populations. These vary from negative rights (that no one shall be subjected to torture, arbitrary interference with family, home, or privacy, or arbitrary property deprivation) to affirmative rights, such as an adequate standard of living, liberty, and personal security. Although human rights law provides a basis for protecting and assisting internally displaced persons, it does not address some situations such as forcible displacement and lack of access to HA. There is a specific need for protection of persons

Appendix C - Legal Authority

internally displaced by conflict. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions reaffirm that during armed conflict those not directly participating in the hostilities shall be treated humanely. Violence, hostage-taking, and outrages upon the dignity of noncombatants during armed conflict are prohibited. As noted previously, the United States applies these principles to all military operations, including FHA. Additionally, Protocol II to the Geneva Convention provides that forced civilian displacement during internal armed conflicts may be undertaken legally only when the civilian's safety or military necessity require it. If civilians have to be moved for either of these two reasons, their evacuation must be under protected, hygienic, and humane conditions. Relevant factors that may be used in classifying displaced persons include external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order.

Refugees and Asylum Seekers

International law defines a refugee as a person outside his or her country of origin, who is unable or unwilling to return because of valid fear of persecution on grounds of race, religion, nationality, social group, or politics. States may be subject to legal consequences for failing to respect the principle of *nonrefoulement* (that no refugee should be returned to any country where he or she is likely to face persecution or danger to life or freedom) or for failing to return refugees back to States under certain conditions. The 1951 *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* and the 1967 *Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees* remain the principal international instruments benefiting refugees. The *United States Refugee Act of 1980* accepts the definition of refugees offered by the 1951 Conventions and 1967 Protocol and also makes provision for annual intakes of refugees from groups of specific humanitarian interest to the United States. DoDD 2000.11, *Procedures for Handling Requests for Political Asylum and Temporary Refuge*, provides more information.

Civilian Detainee Procedures

The detention of civilians during FHA operations will normally be an issue only when HN law enforcement capabilities do not exist. JTF commanders should, however, be prepared to address the handling of civilian detainees within the Joint operations area. Key considerations for development of procedures include:

- Authority permitting detention (What conduct warrants detention and who has legal jurisdiction to conduct criminal trials?)
- Length of time civilians will be detained or processed
- How criminals will be imprisoned
- At what point detainees can be transferred to some recognized security or police force

Eligibility for Medical Care

A determination of eligibility for care in a US medical treatment facility (MTF) must be made at the highest possible level and in conjunction with the supporting SJA. Each category of personnel who might seek emergency or routine treatment (such as DoD contractors; USG civilian employees; and allied, coalition, or HN forces) in a US MTF should be determined prior to initiation of the operation and updated as required.

Claims

JTF elements should investigate and adjudicate claims according to established directives and regulations consistent with the terms of a SOFA or other international agreement that includes claims provisions. A single-service component may be assigned responsibility for processing claims against the USG. Unless otherwise stated in JTF command guidance, unit-level commanders are responsible for investigating incidents of foreign property damage and personal injury or death to foreign nationals

alleged to have been caused by JTF personnel. JTF legal personnel should be appointed as foreign claims commissions with authority to adjudicate and pay foreign claims. Single-service claims authority is established by DoDD 5515.8, *Single-Service Assignment of Responsibility for Processing of Claims*. The supported combatant commander may assign interim responsibility for resolving claims in countries where such assignment has not been made under the directive.

Environment

As a general rule, US environmental laws have no application overseas; however, US personnel are to follow pollution control standards of general applicability in the host country or jurisdiction (Executive Order 12088; DoDI 4715.5, *Management of Environmental Compliance at Overseas Installations*). Where country specific final governing standards (FGS) apply, abide by them. In a foreign nation where the designated DoD environmental executive agent has not established FGS, applicable international agreements, HN standards and the *Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document* (OEBGD) govern. Particular attention should be paid to the disposal of hazardous waste. FGS and OEBGD only apply, however, to installations and facilities. They do not apply to off-installation operational deployments. Such off-installation activities are governed by applicable international agreements and environmental annexes to operation plans and orders.

Law of the Sea

The duty to rescue those in distress at sea is firmly established in customary and conventional international law (Article 98, *UN Convention on the Law of the Sea*, 1982). Asylum seekers have been escaping by sea for many years. Several options are open to the state where those rescued arrive. It may refuse disembarkation and may require ship masters to remove them from the jurisdiction or it may make disembarkation conditional upon satisfactory settlement guarantees. The state may also require care and maintenance to be provided by the flag country, by their country or state of registry, or by international organizations. A categorical refusal of disembarkation cannot be equated with a breach of the principle of nonrefoulement or refuge through time (because of State sovereignty) even though refusal results in serious consequences for asylum seekers.

Rules of Engagement

The sensitive political and international nature of FHA operations require that ROE be established and coordinated with other forces involved in the operation. Chairman of the CJCS Instruction 3121.01A, 15 January 00, *Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces*, provides fundamental policies and

procedures for US commanders. It is US policy that ROE never limit a commander's inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in self defense of the unit or other US forces. ROE for FHA operations will commonly be characterized by restraint. All coalition nations operating within a humanitarian relief area should do so under a commonly established ROE, whenever possible. This is essential to assure consistency of response for all participating forces.

US military forces follow certain precepts essential to ROE. The first is that a commander has the authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take appropriate actions to defend that commander's unit and other US forces in the vicinity from a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent. The second precept is that at all times, the requirements of necessity and proportionality will form the basis for the judgment as to what constitutes an appropriate response to a particular hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent. Necessity exists when a hostile act occurs or when a force or terrorist exhibits hostile intent. Proportionality requires that the use of force must be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude to decisively counter the perceived or demonstrated threat.

ROE should be coordinated in detail and may change as the operation evolves. Changes to ROE must be rapidly disseminated to all personnel. Commanders at all levels may request changes to the ROE through the chain of command. Figure C-1 is provided as a sample ROE card. These ROE were established for forces conducting FHA operations in an uncertain or hostile environment. Such a card may be carried by all personnel for periodic reference.

Intelligence Oversight and Operational Law

Intelligence oversight regulations should be reviewed for applicability, especially with regard to relationships between intelligence personnel and American citizens who work for NGOs and IOs. A legal review should be conducted prior to the initiation of intelligence operations to ensure that there is no

- **You have the right to use force to defend yourself against attacks or threats of attack**
- **Hostile fire may be returned effectively and promptly to stop hostile acts**
- **When US forces are attacked by hostile elements, mobs, and rioters, US forces should use the minimum force necessary under the circumstances and proportional to the threat**
- **You may not seize the property of others to accomplish your mission**
- **Detention of civilians is authorized for security reasons or in self-defense**
- **The United States is not at war**
- **Treat all persons with dignity and respect**
- **Respect local customs and traditions of the host nation**
- **Use minimum force to carry out the mission**
- **Always be prepared to act in self-defense**

Figure C-1. Sample Rules of Engagement Card

Appendix C - Legal Authority

unforeseen impact upon the mission from the conduct of planned intelligence or information gathering operations.

Fiscal Law

Fiscal law principles apply to FHA operations. Expenditures in an FHA operation must be for an authorized purpose and made within applicable time periods and authorized amounts. Congress has provided limited authority for the DoD to conduct overseas humanitarian, disaster, and civic aid operations (Title 10 USC, Section 401, 402, 2547, and 2561). Generally, all costs incurred by the DoD arising from the conduct of HA operations will be reimbursed by the supported federal agency. Increasingly, HA is provided through the drawdown of defense articles from existing stocks. This drawdown authority is provided for in Title 10 USC, Section 2318(1)(A). Because drawdown authority is limited to the use of existing defense articles, commanders must be sensitive to the fiscal limitations involved (for example, no new contracts for goods or services may be made using drawdown funds). All expenditures for HA operations should be reviewed to ensure compliance with fiscal law.

The *Posse Comitatus Act*¹³⁴

The *Posse Comitatus Act* and Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5525.5, *DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Authorities*, provide the authority and define the conditions under which military forces can be employed, as well as criminal penalties and the legal constraints intended to prevent misuse of military force. With the exception of members of the US Coast Guard and members of the National Guard in state service, military personnel are normally prohibited under either the *Posse Comitatus Act* or DoD policy from direct participation in the execution of civil laws in the United States. Under the provisions of this act and DoD policy, military personnel are prohibited from:



National Guard Troops Move Bottles of Water for Hurricane Relief Operations



The Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina

- Participating in the arrest, search and seizure, and stopping and frisking of personnel, or domestic interdiction of vessels, aircraft, or vehicles
- Conducting domestic surveillance or pursuit
- Operating as informants, undercover agents, or investigators in civilian legal matters
- Participating in law enforcement cases or in any other civilian law enforcement activity

Stafford Act¹³⁵

The Federal Response Plan, January 2003, invokes the *Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act*, which provides the authority for the federal government to respond to emergencies and major disasters. The act gives the President the authority to establish a program for disaster preparedness and response support, which is delegated to DHS.

The Denton Amendment¹³⁶

The Denton Amendment authorizes the Denton Program—a commodities transportation program authorized under Title 10 USC Section 402 and jointly administered by the USAID, DoS, and DoD. The Denton Amendment provides the authority for DoD to use extra space on US military cargo aircraft to transport humanitarian assistance materials donated by NGOs, IOs, and PVOs for humanitarian relief.

Appendix D - Quick Situation and Needs Assessment¹³⁷

General

- Village or City Name
- Grid
- Sector
- Language

Population

- Total Population
- Families
- Male
- Female
- Children
- Refugees
- Refugee Origin Abroad

Standard of Living (General Description or Percentage)

- Food
- Water
- Shelter
- Power
- Television
- Radio
- Transportation

Ethnic Composition by Percent

- As required by situation

Politics

- Parties
- Representatives

Emergency Services

- Police
- Fire
- Rescue
- Militia

Key Persons

- Mayor
- Police Chief
- Military Commander
- Representative

Economics

- Unemployed
- Self-Employed
- Nature of Self-Employment
- Employed
- Nature of Employment
- Agriculture
- Industry

Lines of Communication and Utilities

- Communications
- Water Supply

- Electrical Supply
- Road System
- Rail System
- Medical Facilities
- Education Facilities

Observations

- As required by situation



Severely Damaged Buildings and Equipment Seen During Hurricane Katrina

Appendix E - Reference Items and Notes

Important Internet References

Joint Center for Operational Analysis
http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_jcoa.htm

Air Force Lessons Learned
<https://afknowledge.langley.af.mil>

Air Force Knowledge Management
<https://afkm.wpafb.af.mil>

Center for Army Lessons Learned
<http://call.army.mil/>

Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned
<http://www.mccell.usmc.mil/>

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Handbook Acronyms

AOR - Area of responsibility
CJCS - Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMOC - Civil-Military Operations Center
COCOM - Combatant Commander
CRAF - Civil Reserve Air Fleet
DART - Disaster Assistance Response Team

DCO - Defense Coordinating Officer
DFO - Disaster Field Office
DHS - Department of Homeland Security
DJTFAC - Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation
DoD - Department of Defense
DoDD - Department of Defense Directive
DoDI - Department of Defense Instruction
DoS - Department of State
FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency
FHA - Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
HA - Humanitarian Assistance
HACC - Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center
HAST - Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team
HCA - Humanitarian And Civic Assistance
HET - Heavy Equipment Transporter
HN - Host Nation
HOC - Humanitarian Operations Center
ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC - International Federation of Red Cross
IO - International Organization
JFC - Joint Force Commander
JFUB - Joint Facilities Utilization Board
JIACG - Joint Interagency Coordination Group
JMC - Joint Movement Center
JP - Joint Publication
JTF - Joint Task Force
JTFSC - Joint Task Force Support Command
KRN - Korean
LMSR - Large Medium Speed Roll-On Roll-Off Vessel
LOC - Logistics Operations Center
MHE - Material Handling Equipment
MTF - Medical Treatment Facility
NEO - Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
NGO - Nongovernmental Organization
OEBGD - Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document
OFDA - Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
PVO - Private Voluntary Organization
RFA - Request For Assistance
ROE - Rules Of Engagement
SAMMS - Standard Army Materiel Management System
SJA - Staff Judge Advocate
SOFA - Status-of-forces Agreement
STON - Short Ton
TEU - Technical Escort Unit
UN - United Nations
UNAAF - Unified Action Armed Forces
UNV - United Nations Volunteer
USAID - United States Agency for International Development

USARNORTH - United States Army North
USC - United States Code
USG - United States Government
USNORTHCOM - United States Northern Command
USTRANSCOM - United States Transportation Command

Glossary

Consequence Management. Those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive situation. For domestic consequence management, the primary authority rests with the States to respond and the Federal Government to provide assistance as required. (This term and its definition are provided for information and proposed for inclusion in JP 1-02 by JP 3-0.)

Crisis Management. Measure to resolve a hostile situation and investigate and prepare a criminal case for prosecution under federal law. Crisis management will include a response to an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction, special improvised explosive device, or a hostage crisis that is beyond the capability of the lead federal agency. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Dislocated Civilian. A broad term that includes a displaced person, a stateless person, an evacuee, an expellee, or a refugee. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Displaced Person. A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country. (JP 1-02)

Evacuee. A civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation. (JP 1-02)

Foreign Disaster. An act of nature (such as a flood, drought, fire, hurricane, earthquake, volcanic eruption, or epidemic), or an act of man (such as a riot, violence, civil strife, explosion, fire, or epidemic), which is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant United States foreign disaster relief to a foreign country, foreign persons, or to an international organization. (JP 1-02)

Foreign Disaster Relief. Prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. Normally it includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds, and bedding; temporary shelter and

Appendix E - Reference Items

housing; the furnishing of medical materiel and medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing foreign humanitarian assistance. Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. Also called FHA. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Humanitarian Demining. Department of Defense and Department of State program to promote the foreign policy interests of the United States by assisting other nations in protecting their populations from land mines and clearing land of the threat posed by land mines remaining after conflict has ended. The humanitarian demining program includes training of host nation deminers, establishment of national demining organizations, provision of demining equipment, mine awareness training, and research development. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Interagency Coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. (JP 1-02)

Internally Displaced Person. Any person who has left his or her residence by reason of real or imagined danger but has not left the territory of his or her own country. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

International Organization. Organizations with global mandates, generally funded by contributions from national governments. Examples include the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, and United Nation agencies. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Natural Disaster. An emergency situation posing significant danger to life and property that results from a natural cause. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Nongovernmental Organizations. Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). *Nongovernmental organizations* is a term normally used by non-United States organizations. Also called NGOs. (JP 1-02)

Refugee. A person who, by reason of real or imagined danger, has left his or her home country or country of his or her nationality and is unwilling or unable to return. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Rules of Engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-02)

Stateless Person. Civilian who has been denationalized or whose country of origin cannot be determined or who cannot establish a right to the nationality claimed. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Status-of-Forces Agreement. An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as civil affairs agreements. Also called SOFA. (JP 1-02)

Unified Action. A broad generic term that described the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or Joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands. (JP 1-02)

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