Standardizing Afghan Logistics Training for US and NATO Mentors

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Introduction

On 1 December 2009 during a speech at the United States Military Academy, President Barack Obama announced he would send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan as part of the United States' and its international allies' effort to keep pressure on the terror groups.[1] President Obama pointed out "…while we've achieved hard-earned milestones in Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated."[2] Commanders on the ground continued to ask for more troops while the Taliban began controlling certain areas in Afghanistan. The Taliban's ultimate goal has always been to disrupt not only the Afghan government, but the coalition partnerships formed between many countries supporting the war effort.[3]

Under the 30,000 troop increase, United States (US) forces and equipment began deploying in the first part of 2010. Planning is for US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces to turn over sustainment and security responsibilities to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by 2011.[4] The 30,000 troops includes Army brigade combat teams as well as military personnel from the Marines, Air Force, and Navy.[5] These additional forces increase the ability of the US and NATO to train their ANSF counterparts by providing the support, time, and security for mentoring operations.

In his speech, President Obama also emphasized that "Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future."[6] To help achieve this goal, President Obama outlined three key elements.

- **Counterinsurgency.** Pursue a military strategy aimed at stopping the Taliban's momentum and increasing Afghanistan's capacity over the next 18 months. The additional troops will target the insurgency and secure key population centers. President Obama also emphasized he would ask for more international military contributions to support the war in Afghanistan.[7]
- **Civilian surge.** Work with the United Nations and the Afghan people in pursuing an effective civilian strategy. The aim here is to reinforce positive actions in addition to working with US allies, international agencies, and the Afghan people.[8]
- **Effective partnerships.** Recognize that success in Afghanistan is linked to our partnership with Pakistan. President Obama highlighted the fact that "…we need a strategy that works on both sides of the border."[9]

President Obama's decision to increase troop levels came after many discussions and meetings with his cabinet to include General Stanley McChrystal, then Commander, US Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and Commander, International Security Assistance Forces (COMISAF), who provided a candid assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. In his unclassified assessment obtained by the Washington Post, General McChrystal reported the situation as "serious" and "the stakes in Afghanistan are high."[10] General McChrystal further stated "success is achievable," but requires a "...significant change to our strategy and the way that we think and operate."[11] The key take-away from his assessment is that NATO's International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) require a new strategy so that the Afghans will embrace and begin conducting independent operations. Additionally, ISAF needs to grow and improve the effectiveness of ANSF forces by legitimizing its importance to the Afghan government.[12] General McChrystal concluded his assessment by identifying the following recommendations.[13]

- Grow the Afghan National Army (ANA) to a target authorization of 240,000
- Grow and develop the Afghan National Police (ANP) to a total of 160,000
- Realign and streamline the responsibilities of ANSF generation and development
- Provide Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) direct authority to obligate Afghan security forces funding without passing actions through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to shorten capabilities procurement timelines and avoid unnecessary fees
- Shift the responsibility and authority for execution of all police training from the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement to CSTC-A to enhance unity of effort in police development

The purpose of this article is to primarily focus on the third item, realign and streamline the responsibilities of ANSF generation and development, by specifically examining how US and NATO forces are trained to mentor the ANA in logistics operations.

Background

Dictionary.com defines a mentor as, "A wise and trusted counselor or teacher; an influential senior sponsor or supporter."[14]

In Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq and past conflicts such as Vietnam and Korea, mentors have played key roles in helping their foreign counterparts learn how to become self sustained, how to lead, and eventually, how to conduct operations on their own with minimal supervision. The US Army traditionally calls its mentors combat advisors (CA), but the actual name varies depending on the type of mentoring mission a Service member is assigned to perform.[15] A CA's mission is to teach, coach, and mentor his or her host nation security force counterparts so as to accomplish the following.[16]

- Rapidly develop counterparts' leadership capabilities
- Help develop command and control and operational capabilities at every echelon
- Allow direct access to coalition forces' enablers to enhance host nation security force counterinsurgency operations
- Incorporate coalition forces' lethal and nonlethal effects on the battlefield

Figure 1 outlines the various types of mentoring teams supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

Under General McChrystal's recommendation to "realign and streamline the responsibilities of ANSF generation and development," he outlines three subcomponents:[18]

- Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A)/NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) focuses on ANSF force generation consistent with operational requirements, develops Afghan ministerial and institutional capabilities, and resources the fielded forces.
- Shift responsibility for development of fielded ANSF to the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command (IJC).
- Employ enhanced partnering and mentoring to more rapidly develop Afghan forces.

General McChrystal realized ISAF could not continue operating as it had done in the past and needed a new strategy. This new strategy had to be one that the Afghans would believe in along with being able to sustain ANSF Forces. The strategy also needed to be properly resourced and executed by a civilian-military counterinsurgency campaign. Additionally, the Afghan people had to support this new strategy, otherwise it would not succeed.[19]

General McChrystal also noted ISAF was poorly configured for counterinsurgency operations, did not understand the local language and culture, and struggled with the challenges of being in coalition warfare.[20] To fix the problem, General McChrystal clarified and reorganized ISAF's command relationships for achieving better unity of command and unity of effort. Under the old ISAF organizational structure, each of ISAF's subordinate headquarters had separate campaigns and was not organized effectively.[21]

Figure 2 shows USFOR-A and ISAF's reorganized C2 organizational structure.

In reorganizing ISAF's command relationships, General McChrystal established a new intermediate operational headquarters known as ISAF Joint Command (IJC). Under this construct, ISAF headquarters could focus primarily on strategic and operational issues, while IJC could concentrate on synchronizing operational missions and enhancing civil-military coordination. IJC also became directly responsible for all ANSF mentoring teams with CSTC-A and NTM-A focusing on ANSF institution building, force generation, force sustainment, and leader development.[24] For the US and NATO mentors out in the field, the battlespace owners were now responsible for both mentorship and kinetic operations in their respective areas of

OIF		OEF	
BN MTT	Motorized Transport TT	BNN ETT	Medical Operations ETT
BDE MTT	Logistical and Admin TT	BDE ETT	Garrison Support ETT
DIV MTT	Logistical BN TT	Corps ETT	Air Operations Command ETT
BN Border TT	Medical Operations Advisory TT	CS BN ETT	OTSG Mentor Team
BDE Border TT	AF C-130 Advisory TT	BDE Support ETT	Medical Treatment ETT
REG Border TT	Garrison Support Unit TT	Corps Support ETT	Drill Instructor ETT
BN National Police TT	Regional Support Unit TT	CSS ETT	Class V Depot ETT
BDE National Police TT	Iraqi Ground Forces Command TT	Afghan National Police ETT	Commo Support ETT
DIV National Police TT	NCC Advisory TT	Afghan National Police Regional HQ ETT	Central Workshop ETT
Air Force Military TT	Medical Assistance TT	Afghan National Police Clinic ETT	Validation ETT
MOI TT	MOI Intelligence TT	Forward Support Depot ETT	TAG Augmentee Cell ETT
MOD TT	Iraqi Air Force Support Operations TT	Forward Support Command ETT	BDE Material Afghan National Army Management Office ETT

Figure 1. Mentoring Team Types[17]



Figure 2. USFOR-A and COMISAF C2 Structure[22] [23]

responsibility (AOR) while ensuring everything was synchronized with ISAF's priorities.[25]

During a 365-tour in Afghanistan (July 2008 to July 2009), the author deployed as the Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix (CJTF Phx) Deputy Logistics Director (Dep J4) and later as the ANSF Logistics Cell Chief (ANSF Log Cell). Based on his personal experience, two significant problems came to light in supporting the ANSF logistics mentoring mission. First, predeployment training locations were not providing adequate ANSF logistics training. Second, once the mentoring teams arrived in country, they had to quickly learn the ANSF logistics process while at the same time, mentoring their Afghan counterparts.

In response to these two challenges, Major Mike McPherson, Lieutenant Colonel Lori Strode and Major Pat Holland, developed the *CJTF Phx ANA Logistics Mentor Training Handbook*. Additionally, they created a three-hour block of instruction for mentoring teams in-processing through Camp Phoenix before heading out to their final location.[26] These efforts allowed the mentoring teams to learn about ANSF logistics while giving them the tools needed to become successful mentors. As part of an overall effort to provide future mentors continuity and a foundation for learning about Afghan logistics, the Center for Army's Lessons Learned (CALL) formally published the CJTF Phx handbook as the *ANA Logistics Mentor Training Handbook* on 2 July 2009.[27]

Article Acronyms

ANA – Afghan National Army
ANP – Afghan National Police
ANSF – Afghan National Security Forces
AOR – Area of Responsibility
ARSIC – Afghan Regional Security Integration Command
ARSIC-K – Afghan Regional Security Integration Command-Kabul
AT&L — Acquisition Technology & Logistics
BDE – Brigade
C2 – Command and Control
CA – Combat Advisor
CALL – Center for Army Lessons Learned
CD-ROM – Compact Disk-Read Only Memory
CJTF Phx – Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix
COMISAF – Commander, International Security Assistance Forces
CSS – Combat Service Support
CSTC-A – Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
CSTC-A-LTAG – Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan/Logistics Training Advisory Group
ETT – Embedded Training Team
FOB – Forward Operating Base
FSD – Forward Support Depot
HNSF – Host Nation [or Foreign] Security Forces
IJC – International Security Assistance Force Joint Command
ISAF – International Security Assistance Forces
JFTC – Joint Force Training Centre
KMTC – Kabul Military Training Center
LTAG - Logistics Training Advisory Group
METL – Mission Essential Task Listing
MoD – Ministry of Defense
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NTM-A – NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom
OJT – On-the-Job Training
OMLT – Operational Mentor Liaison Team
POI – Program of Instruction
RIP/TOA – Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority
SME – Subject Matter Expert
TTP – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
US – United States
USFOR-A – United States Forces – Afghanistan

Research Questions

This article addresses the following questions.

- How are US and NATO mentors being trained on Afghan logistics while ensuring the training received is standardized so that ANSF will one day have a seamless logistics process?
- Where do US and NATO mentors receive their predeployment training and what curriculum is being taught to them?
- How often are the training curriculums updated and what are the primary sources used to update the curriculum?
- What products are available to US and NATO mentors that cover the Afghan logistics process?

Investigative Questions

The author developed interview questions to help guide data collection for the research effort. Interview questions were grouped into two parts. Part I covered questions for either a predeployment training site or an organization responsible for developing or teaching the Afghan logistics processes. Part II targeted mentoring teams and headquarters personnel directly involved in supporting Afghan logistics. The following are the primary questions that were used.

Part I – Predeployment Training Sites or Organization

- What curriculum does your organization teach or develop to help prepare military personnel for their mentoring mission in Afghanistan? Is it possible to obtain a copy of it?
- How often is the curriculum updated in order to keep pace with ongoing operations in Afghanistan?
- Who are your subject matter experts to ensure the curriculum is relevant?
- How many instructors do you have who teach Afghan logistics?
- How often have the instructors deployed and to what locations?
- What other units or organizations have contributed to your curriculum development?
- What products do you offer that cover the Afghan logistics process?

Part II – Mentoring Teams or Headquarters Personnel Involved with Afghan Logistics

- What is your current position or role in supporting Afghan logistics?
- Where did you receive your predeployment training and what curriculum did they teach?
- What branch of Service are you?
- What is your career field?
- How often have you deployed and to what locations?
- How much experience do you have working with Afghan logistics?
- When you arrived in country, what type of training did you receive on Afghan logistics?

Literature Review and Historical Data Search

The author collected key products that served as a baseline for research. Using the CJTF Phx *ANA Logistics Mentor Training Handbook*, the author compared this handbook against the curriculum being taught at the predeployment training sites, as well as the organizations responsible for developing Afghan logistics curriculum.[28] In addition, the author obtained a copy of the *Combat Advisor Handbook* published by CALL and the *Afghanistan Combat Advisor Development Program Course* book used for predeployment training at Fort Riley, Kansas.[29] [30] The author also collected training products from the predeployment training sites.

Assumptions

The author made the following assumptions. They are not necessarily all-inclusive, but highlight the overarching concerns and unknowns.

- The Afghan logistics processes will stay relatively the same despite any reorganization by USFOR-A and NATO's ISAF.
- If given enough time, even though there are ongoing operations in Afghanistan, mentors and headquarters personnel will be able to respond to surveys.
- The CJTF Phx *ANA Logistics Mentor Training Handbook* is adequate enough to serve as a baseline in determining whether Afghan logistics training is standardized.
- Predeployment training sites are teaching the same curriculum to prepare US and NATO forces for the logistics mentoring missions.
- The lack of Afghan logistics training negatively impacts all the Service branches (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) in supporting the mentoring missions.
- Because of the ongoing coalition partnership between the US and NATO, the author will be able to obtain curriculum and information from the operational mentor liaison team (OMLT) mentors.

Limitations of Research

The research focused only on Afghan logistics training and how it affected the ANA.

Methodology

In conducting the research for this article, the author chose a qualitative research approach. According to Leedy and Ormrod, the qualitative research approach is "…typically used to answer questions about the complex nature of phenomena, often with the purpose of describing and understanding the phenomena from the participants' point of view."[31]

Research Design and Data Collection

Using the qualitative approach, the author selected a case study design to drive the research methodology and data collection. The data collected by the author came in a variety of forms such as e-mails, briefings, handbooks, and newspaper articles. In addition to collecting and reviewing key documents, the author conducted phone interviews and e-mailed questionnaires to potential participants. If for some reason the author and participant were unable to conduct an interview, the author accepted e-mail responses and followed up as necessary.

Analysis of Data and Results

Once all of the data was collected, the author organized and presented it in a logical format that helped with categorizing the data, identifying any patterns associated with it, and drawing potential solutions and recommendations. The ultimate goal of the data collection was to distinguish the similarities and differences between what and how US and NATO mentors receive as Afghan logistics training.

Discussion

Based on the research and investigative questions previously outlined, the author e-mailed an interview questionnaire to past and present US logistics mentors, as well as key organizations, that contributed to either building or conducting Afghan logistics training. The author also received briefing slides, training curriculum, and other pertinent information to help provide a clear picture of how training was being conducted for the mentors. A total of 74 requests were sent out to potential participants (28 of the requests were forwarded within Afghanistan to other mentors). Of the 74 e-mail requests, the author received 31 responses back (42 percent response rate). Seven of the 31 responses either assisted the author in identifying other potential participants to send the questionnaire to or declined to participate in the research altogether citing one of the following reasons.

- Person(s) did not think their job or position in Afghanistan was relevant to the research.
- Person(s) had no time to participate in the research because of their daily workload. (Note: This situation applied to both personnel already back home in the US and personnel supporting ongoing operations in Afghanistan.)

In the end, the author had 24 respondents (35.1 percent response rate) who provided valuable insight into how Afghan logistics training was being conducted in preparing US and NATO mentors for their advisory roles. The following is a summary of the major themes and trends for each of the investigative questions. (Note: Due to the similarity of some questions in Parts I and II, the author combined some responses together to eliminate redundancy.)

Part I – Predeployment Training Sites or Organization

1. What curriculum does your organization teach or develop to help prepare military personnel for their mentoring mission in Afghanistan? Is it possible to obtain a copy of the curriculum?

Training curriculum for the Afghan logistics mentoring mission is being developed and taught using a variety of methods and at various organizational levels both in the US and overseas locations. The actual teaching methods employed range from on-the-job (OJT) training once a mentor arrives in country to receiving a formal course taught at either an established training center or power projection platform, such as predeployment training in Fort Polk, Louisiana or Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Table 1 shows the two broad categories training (learning) fall into.[32]

The author identified two primary predeployment training sites used to train US and NATO forces preparing to assume mentoring missions in Afghanistan. The two sites are Fort Polk, Louisiana (formerly Fort Riley, Kansas) and the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC), Bydgoszcz, Poland. At Fort Polk, the 162d Infantry Brigade (BDE) conducts US mentor training for personnel deploying to either Iraq or Afghanistan.[34] The brigade became fully activated in May 2009 and transitioned the CA training mission from Fort Riley to Fort Polk in August 2009.[35]

Fort Polk's training curriculum is based on a combat service support (CSS) construct so mentors will have a better understanding of the CSS functional areas and associated administrative support.[36] The curriculum begins by teaching mentors the US Army logistics system followed by lessons on how to train foreign security forces (FSF) in logistics.[37] Previous research conducted by Captain Joseph Whittington pointed out more CSS familiarization training was needed in predeployment training to properly prepare logistics readiness officers for embedded training team missions.[38] Mentors are taught the six learning objectives along with the associated tasks shown in Table 2.

Even though the program of instruction (POI) focuses on objectives for FSFs in both theaters, Fort Polk does offer specialized Afghan logistics training that is covered throughout the one and one-half days of instruction. The students are usually comprised of both Iraq and Afghan mentors. Because of time constraints, the instructors tailor the class based on the overall majority of mentors deploying to a particular country (Afghanistan). Each mentor also receives a compact disk (CD-ROM) containing Iraq and Afghanistan information and resources for future reference.[40]

Predeployment training for OMLT mentors is conducted slightly differently than the training at Fort Polk. Whereas Fort Polk's training is centered on CSS, the OMLT training focuses on running a garrison support unit. OMLT training is conducted in three phases: National Training Objectives, NATO Centralized Training, and ISAF Aim of Training (theater employment of teams). The author focused on Phase II, NATO Centralized Training, because it is the only phase that contains an Afghan logistics curriculum. Training takes approximately one day and covers the areas shown in Table 3.

2. How often is the curriculum updated in order to keep pace with ongoing operations in Afghanistan?

The original intent of this question was to poll the US and NATO predeployment training sites to determine how current was the Afghan logistics curriculum being taught to mentors. Upon reviewing the responses, it turns out this question also applied to the informal training material being used in the field. Six of the 24 participants responded by providing the statements that follow:

- "Was recently built, but I need to link with NTM-A/CSTC-A or the IJC for currency." (Major, 2-130 IN XO[45])
- "Is updated once a year…. Primary sources used to update the curriculum are the instructor SMEs and the feedback given by the logistics mentors." (Log Coordinator of JFTC, OMLT Section[46])
- "Updated as often as it needs to [be] based on the training mission of KMTC." (CPT, S-4 Advisor to Kabul Military Training Center Group[47])
- "Production of the curriculums moved at a very slow pace. In one year's time I only saw the production and publication of one new logistics manual." (Captain, Senior Advisor to 4th Forward Support Depot[48])
- "An effort is made to update the curriculum whenever there is a significant change in material." (Lieutenant Colonel, Chief of Logistics Training Advisory Group Integration Branch[49])
- "Updated regularly with any additional information received from the country as well as feedback received via student questionnaire."(CPT, CA Instructor, 162d Infantry Brigade[50])

Learning about Afghan logistics is challenging, but keeping the training curriculum updated is an even harder challenge and requires a coordinated effort between the mentors, their higher headquarters, and the predeployment training locations. The author experienced this challenge first-hand. Within a month after the *CJTF Phx ANA Logistics Mentor Training Handbook* was published, the majority of the command and organizational structures were already out of date. Even though parts of the handbook are outdated, at the time of writing of this article some mentors in Afghanistan were still using it as a source document. This included the predeployment training sites at the 162d BDE and JFTC.[51] [52] A US mentor in theater recognized the handbook was outdated, yet stated "…it's still a pretty good document."[53]

3. Who are your subject matter experts (SMEs) to ensure the curriculum is relevant?

This question directly relates to the previous one. In order for mentors and predeployment training sites to maintain an updated curriculum, they need to have a person or resource that can provide the latest information from the field. Responses to the question came from civilian contractors (MPRI, DynCorp), military mentors, and civilian advisors. Three of the eight

Informal	Formal
- On-the-job training - Continuity books - Briefings and slides - Lessons learned - Personnel in-processing in-theater	- Combat skills training, Fort Polk, LA - Joint Force Training Centre, Poland - Kabul Military Training Center, Kabul - Handbooks and lessons learned - Afghan decrees and doctrine

Table 1. Training Categories[33]

responses illustrate both the good and bad of how mentors and organizations are obtaining current information.

- The 162d BDE works hard to establish and maintain POCs within Iraq and Afghanistan, especially the students transitioning through the predeployment training. Fort Polk is regularly updating its curriculum based on student feedback and information received from mentors in country.[54]
- One US mentor spent the past 17 months in Afghanistan working ANSF logistics. Based on his experiences and contacts with other organizations in the AOR, he developed training slides to help other US and NATO mentors within the Kabul Military Training Center.[55]
- The OMLT logistics coordinator had an opposite experience compared to the two previous respondents. His organization, JFTC in Poland, is responsible for providing ANSF logistics training to OMLT mentors before their deployment into Afghanistan. The JFTC relies solely on US SMEs with current experience in country. These SMEs instruct portions of the logistics training, but it is difficult to bring them out of theater. JFTC has had one US logistics mentor who has been working with them since his redeployment back to home station in March 2009.[56] [57]

4. How many instructors do you have who teach Afghan logistics?

The author geared this question toward predeployment training sites. While it is important to have the right number of mentors on the ground, the author focused solely on who from these training sites is teaching Afghan logistics and did not look at the mentor manpower assigned to Afghan logistics training.[58] With regards to JFTC, which relies heavily on US SMEs, usually the AOR can provide at least one US logistics mentor to be an instructor. At the OMLT training session in November 2009, JFTC had three US mentors.[59]

For predeployment training in the US, the 162d BDE has four instructors who teach the CA mission. All of the instructors have experience in Iraq, but not Afghanistan. Prior to the CA training mission moving to Fort Polk, two of the respondents commented that when the one Army captain from Fort Riley, who taught Afghan logistics transferred to a new duty location, she was not replaced and an instructor with Iraqi experience took over the course. Today, the same situation continues at Fort Polk. The key takeaway from respondents' comments is "…had to have someone who's been there and can teach it." Likewise, "How is a person who's never been to Afghanistan going to train others?"[60] [61]

5. How often have the instructors deployed and to what locations?

Responses regarding deployment experience varied from statements such as having "…one rotation or deployment to Afghanistan" to "…advisors with extensive years of service and various past deployments to other countries."[62] [63] Past deployment experiences are good, but an instructor has to have experience working the logistics mentoring mission in Afghanistan, otherwise how is he or she going to train others?[64] This same theme is repeated in investigative question number 12.

6. What other units or organizations have contributed to your curriculum development?

This question is very similar to question number 3. Based on the responses, Figure 3 depicts the units and organizations who have contributed to Afghan logistics training. It is important to note that ANSF forces have a stake in the outcome and should

Enabling Learning Objective	Associated Tasks
Combat Advisor Sustainment	Understand US Army logistics systems
FSF CSS Overview	Understand host nation CSS procedures
Contracting Capabilities/Field Ordering Officer (FOO)	- Understand US contracting guidelines - Understand roles and responsibilities of the FOO - Understand nonstandard sources of supply
Mortuary Affairs (MA)/ Summary Court Martial Officer (SCMO)	Understand what is involved with MA for a small team and how to conduct SCMO duties
RIP/TOA Best Practices	Understand RIP/TOA intent and theater guidelines
Battle Damage Assessment and Repair (BDAR)/ Maintenance	Familiarize team logisticians with the BDAR kit

Table 2. Program of Instruction (POI) Learning Objectives and Tasks for CSS[39]

Functional Area Training	Learning Objectives
ANA Logistics Overview	- ANA logistics doctrine - ANA logistics at different levels - Basic logistics procedures - Role of OMLT in ANA logistics - Facilitator to link to specific unit/situation in respective region
Functional Areas and Logistics Decrees	- Logistics functional areas - Main responsibilities in functional areas - Logistics regulations - MoD decrees on logistics and support
Logistics Planning and Management	- Definition of classes (of supply) 1-9 - Decree 4.0 MoD forms
Logistics Establishment	- Logistics facilities - Establishment of a logistics facility
Logistics Operations	- Transportation operations - Medical operations - Tactical operations - Logistics intelligence operations
TF Phx ANA Logistics Mentor Training Handbook	- Process of logistics reports - Independent sustainment - Assessment of checklists - Soldier and unit logistics training plan - Case study exercise

Table 3. OMLT Functional Area Training[41] [42]

be contributing to their own curriculum development. As one respondent put it, "…the goal of any mentor should be to work themselves out of a job."[65]

7. What products do you offer that cover the Afghan logistics process?

Much like the training categories shown in Table 1, the author identified the products, both formal and informal, used to prepare US and NATO mentors for their deployment to Afghanistan. Some of these products focus exclusively on Afghan logistics processes while other products provide a brief overview of the Afghan mentoring mission along with helpful information, such as cultural awareness and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). The following is a brief description of each product.

Formal:

- ***Combat Advisor Handbook (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures)***. CALL published this handbook for US Service members attending predeployment training at Fort Riley, Kansas. While the training has moved to Fort Polk, Louisiana, the information is still pertinent and setup so it can be used by mentors deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan.[67]
- ***CJTF PHX ANA Logistics Mentor Training Handbook***. CJTF Phx J4 created this handbook for US and NATO forces conducting the ANSF logistics mission. While the handbook primarily focuses on ANA processes and organization, it also applies to mentors serving in other ANSF roles such as police mentoring, air corps, and commandos.[68]
- **OEF Embedded Training Teams (ETT), *First 100 Days Handbook***. This handbook provides ETT members with key information they will need to know and understand in their first 100 days in country. Items covered are based on theater interviews and redeployment surveys covering the most important topics identified by previous mentors.[69]

Informal:

- ***Afghanistan Combat Advisor Development Program Course* book**. The course book is a compilation of briefing slides, news, and journal articles used to orient and get US Service members thinking about their role as CAs.[70]
- **Logistics Training Advisory Group (LTAG) Course Slides**. These briefings present training on how to order and receive supplies for ANA and ANP. They also outline general accountability requirements for tracking expendable supplies and equipment.[71] LTAG, in conjunction with IJC, is working to coordinate training opportunities for mentors in theater.[72]
- **Kabul Military Training Center's (KMTC) Training Slides**. KMTC's S-4 developed ANA Logistics 101 and 201 slides in order to train KMTC mentors on ANA supply chain procedures.[73] These slides were created based on the mentor's experiences working ANSF logistics for the previous 17 months.
- **162d BDE Combat Advisor CD**. The 162d BDE hands each mentor a CD containing reference material for both Iraq and Afghanistan. The CD also contains valuable information on the Army logistics processes that US mentoring teams will need to know in order to sustain operations (property book, ordering classes of supply).[74]

Part II – Mentoring Teams or Headquarters Personnel Involved with Afghan Logistics

8. What is your current position or role in supporting Afghan logistics?

Of the 24 respondents, 4 were in Afghanistan supporting Afghan logistics. Nineteen respondents had previously served in an ANSF role and had redeployed back to the states. The final respondent has deployment experience in Iraq, but not Afghanistan. Table 4 breaks down the duty titles for each respondent.

9. Where did you receive your predeployment training and what curriculum did they teach?

When it comes to mentors learning and understanding ANSF logistics, the logistics training received ranges from nonexistent or minimal at best, to full-blown blocks of instruction. Of the 24 respondents for this question, 5 out of 12 people who attended predeployment training at either Fort Riley, Kansas or Fort Polk, Louisiana, stated ANSF logistics training was available, but minimal at best.[76] One US mentor summed up his response by saying the "Bottom-line is that none of the folks who went through Fort Riley or Fort Polk received adequate training on the Afghan National Logistics System."[77] The other nine respondents, who attended combat skills training elsewhere—Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Camp Guernsey, Wyoming; or Joint-base MDL (McGuire, Dix, Lakehurst)— identified no Afghan logistics training as part of their overall predeployment training.[78]



Figure 3. Contributors to ANSF Logistics Training[66]

10. What branch of Service are you? What is your current career field?

Of the 24 participants in this study, 7 were assigned to the Army (5 to Army National Guard), 1 from the Navy, 15 from the Air Force, and 1 from NATO. Although not represented here, US Marines are also filling combat advisory roles in Afghanistan. Table 5 shows the breakdown for each of the respondent's Service branch and career field.

11. How often have you deployed and to what locations? How much experience do you have working with Afghan logistics?

Prior to their Afghanistan deployment, many of the participants had already deployed at least one, if not two or three times, to other locations. Only one respondent stated that he had deployed to Afghanistan previously, but he was not involved in the mentoring mission.[80] These responses were significant because they showed many Service members worked Afghan logistics for the first time. None of the respondents had any prior Afghan logistics experience. After completing their deployment, respondents had anywhere from 6 to 17 months of mentoring experience. One respondent continues to interface with US mentors in order help improve Afghan logistics training. This question was a key finding because it showed that all of the respondents needed some type of training in order to become successful in mentoring Afghan logistics.

12. When you arrived in country, what type of training did you receive on Afghan logistics?

Once US or NATO mentoring teams arrived in country, training continued either in the form of OJT with the outgoing team or teams learned *on the fly* while mentoring their Afghan counterparts. Figure 4 illustrates the types of training US mentors received once they arrived in country.

This graph also shows how the respondents learned to perform his or her roles and does not reflect if the mentor utilized any other training method (CBT, classroom). The author did not examine the number of days spent conducting OJT. This effort would require additional research and was beyond the research scope. However, based on a couple of comments received, the incoming and outgoing mentors spent anywhere from 1 to 10 days of turnover.[82] Four respondents stated they received no Afghan logistics training upon arrival in theater.[83] Four others indicated they were given some type of in-processing training. Again, the amount of time spent ranged from a two-hour overview of Afghan logistics, to a two- or three-day training course led by a contractor.[84]

Findings and Potential Solutions

This section outlines findings and presents potential solutions based on the data collection and analysis. Using the research and investigative questions, the author's goal was to determine if Afghan logistics training is standardized across-the-board between US and NATO mentoring teams.

Findings

1. Afghan logistics training for US and NATO mentors is not standardized.

There is no standardized predeployment training for US and NATO mentor teams. Four main reasons account for this situation. First, US and NATO predeployment training is vastly different from each other and focus the learning material at different levels.

Currently Deployed	Previously Deployed
- Chief, CSTC-A LTAG Integration Branch Consolidated Fielding Center (CFC) S4 - Commando and ANA Special Forces S4 - Kabul Military Training Center Mentor Group S4 (KMG S4) - Senior Mentor, 1st Forward Support Depot	- CFC J4 Mentor - CJTF Phx Chief of Staff - CJTF Phx VII J4 - CJTF Phx VIII J4 - CJTF Phx J4, ANSF Log Cell Chief - CJTF Phx J4, ANSF Log Cell, ANP NCOIC - CJTF Phx J4, Contracting and Services Officer - CSTC-A Log ETT Integration Chief - Commander, Afghanistan Regional Security Integration Command (ARSIC-K) - Deputy Commander, 438th Air Advisory Expedition Group - Log/Garrison Spt Coordinator for OMLT Trng - Regional Police Advisory Cmd XO for Kabul - Senior Advisor, ANA Logistics Command, Commanding General - Senior Advisor, 1st Forward Support Depot - Senior Advisor, 2d Forward Support Depot - Senior Advisor, 4th Forward Support Depot - Senior Advisor, Forward Spt Group Commander - Senior Advisor, Ministry of Defense for AT&L - Senior Advisor, Central Workshop - Captain, 162d Infantry Brigade

Table 4. Respondents' Positions and Roles in Afghanistan[75]

Career Field	USA	USN	USAF	NATO
Finance and Budget			1	
Force Support			1	
Infantry	2			
Logistics	4		13	1
Personnel	1			
Pilot		1		
Totals	7	1	15	1

Table 5. Branch of Service and Career Field[79]



Figure 4. Type of Training[81]

Predeployment training at Fort Polk provides generalized FSF training to both Iraq and Afghanistan mentors at the same time. The 162d BDE instructors try to ensure each mentor understands his or her roles and responsibilities by asking questions and seeking feedback from the students. However, because of time constraints, instructors end up tailoring their lessons based on the majority of mentors deploying to a specific country.[85]

A major problem with the 162d BDE's training structure is that it makes some invalid assumptions. They are as follows:

- **All host nation [or foreign] security forces (HNSF) conduct logistics operations the same way.** While some combat advisory techniques can be applied to both theaters, the specific logistics processes for Iraq and Afghanistan are quite different and unique to each country. For example, Afghan logistics covers both the ANA and ANP. Each has similar processes, but falls under different government ministries with its own set of policies and caveats.[86]
- **Mentors have time, once they get in country, to receive specialized Afghan logistics training.** Figure 4 provided a glimpse of how mentors are learning about their new roles as Afghan logistics mentors. While it is hoped that new mentors will have overlap with the people they are replacing, the training foundation needs to be established at predeployment training sites first. What is occurring in analogous to a person waiting until he or she deploys to receive weapons qualification. Obviously, this would not make any sense, especially if the person is expected to conduct combat operations immediately upon arrival. Why should Afghan logistics mentors be any different?
- **Any combat advisor or instructor can teach HNSF for both Iraq and Afghanistan.** Based on the author's predeployment training experience, this became a problem when students began asking the instructor specific questions, particularly if the instructor had never deployed to Afghanistan. As noted by one respondent, this created a "huge training gap and knowledge with mentors."[87] It also put the burden back on the mentors' shoulders to get needed specific training when they arrive in country.[88]

In contrast to Fort Polk's training, OMLT mentors receive specialized Afghan logistics training during phase two of the JFTC training program. The course material is geared toward the functions they will be required to perform upon arrival in-theater. JFTC's course material is based on information they collected from down range in Afghanistan. The course also has guest lecturers who have Afghan logistics experience. It is also interesting to note that prior to development of OMLT's phase II training course, the JFTC reached out to SMEs from various organizations in order to help them develop a mission essential task listing (METL) for the OMLT mentoring mission. Figure 5 depicts the requirements that went into the METL listing.

There is no centralized standard logistics platform for teaching Afghan logistics.[90] This problem not only existed between US and NATO mentors, but also among other US forces as well. For example, Army National Guard units mobilize and receive their predeployment training at a different location from an active duty Army unit (10th Mountain Division).[91] Even in-theater, this problem still existed when CJTF Phx J4 set up a centralized location to conduct Afghan logistics training. Active duty units reported directly to their forward operating locations and were not required to in-process through Camp Phoenix. OMLT teams reported directly to their final destinations and were not required to in-process through any specific location.

The language barrier between US and NATO mentors and their Afghan counterparts hampered logistics operations.[92] In the 2008-2009 time frame, logistics mentors at the national level developed Afghan Decree 4.0 in English first and then had the documents translated into either Dari or Pashtu, so the Afghans would accept it. The problem mentors soon discovered was that English phrases did not translate well into either language.[93] The Afghans ended up with a document that did not make sense to them. This situation only becomes more complicated when OMLT mentors are added into the equation. Afghans know how to speak some English, but not necessarily German, Albanian, or Dutch. In the end, the Afghans began writing their own documents and then the mentors would have them translated into their own language.[94]

There was a lack of standardization and no emphasis put on Afghan logistics at the corps level.[95] Like US mentoring teams, OMLTs come from different backgrounds and continuity levels. A NATO mentor from JFTC stated "ANSF is confronted with logistics mentors of different NATO and non-NATO nations. Within NATO, there is a logistics guideline, but this info is not available for non-NATO OMLT mentors…"[96] To help compensate for this problem, OMLTs mainly use US logistics doctrine and rely on key products such as the CJTF Phx *ANA Logistics Mentoring Handbook*.[97]

Some US mentors also experience a high turnover rate with their OMLT counterparts, making long-term continuity difficult. Also, adding to the frustration were the unique caveats OMLTs brought with them in-theater. A US mentor gave two examples that highlighted the challenges.[98] First, the Canadians couldn't supply arms [weapons] to their Afghan counterparts without running a background check first. Needless to say, the forward support depot (FSD) stayed full of Canadian equipment because they could not issue items out because of the caveat.[99] Second, British teams came to the FSD looking for supplies and equipment, having the full expectation that the Afghans would be able to provide a full and robust logistics capability.[100]

2. There is a lack of Afghan logistics mentoring experience.

All of the study participants experienced Afghan logistics mentoring for the first time during their deployment in Afghanistan. Out of the 24 respondents, 16 of them were US Navy and Air Force. Based on how Fort Polk's predeployment training is set up, US mentors were not able to get a lot of the specialized training until they arrive in country. Unless Navy and Air Force, mentors have previously deployed with the Army, they must learn a new support system because the Afghan logistics system is modeled after the US Army's system.[101] This automatically puts the mentors at a huge disadvantage and forces them play catch-up with *late-to-need* training.[102] Further, mentors arrived with no baseline or foundation and began advising the Afghans. Depending on the mentor's personality, they either find the right information and answers or form bad habits from the start.[103] US mentors need to show up prepared. The "…we're going to keep doing it the way they've been doing it…."[104] mindset is unacceptable.

3. All mentors, not just team's S-4 (logisticians), need to understand how the Afghan logistics process works.

Afghan logistics training is not something that only the team's S-4 mentor should worry about. Everybody on the team needs

an understanding of how the Afghan logistics process works. Otherwise as one mentor put it, "It's like saying only guys in the communication squadron need to know how to use e-mail."[105] This lack of understanding could and does negatively impact operations. For example, an Afghan Regional Security Integration Command (ARSIC) commander wanted to move halal meals to some outlying forward operating bases and had his S-3 plan the mission. When it came time to execute, the ARSIC went to the FSD to get the meals, but did not realize FSD did not have any in stock. To make matters worse, the FSD pointedly explained to the S-3 planner that the meals were long lead time items.[106] From the mentor's standpoint who worked this tasker, the operational side of the ARSIC wanted nothing to do with the logistics and *divorced themselves* from the process.[107]

Part of the reason this situation is happening is that the predeployment sites, such as Fort Polk, have little focus on logistics and primarily focus mentor training on a *shoot, move, communicate* mentality.[108] Also, Fort Polk does not require all of its mentors to attend FSF logistics training. Team leaders are asked to identify who their logistics mentors are so they can attend the training.[109] On the other hand, JFTC has its OMLT training set up to provide an overview of Afghan logistics for all team members and then conducts specialized Afghan logistics training with the designated logistics mentors.[110] The downside to the Fort Polk approach is readily apparent: (1) team members are not prepared to pick up the slack if something happens to the logistics mentor and (2) team members do not understand how Afghan logistics processes can impact their operations.[111]

Disconnects were also seen between the mentors and higher headquarters staff. A US mentor explained it this way: "There was constant tension between CSTC-A staff and mentors. The US plan was not coordinated with the mentors…hence, no 'Afghan face' [solution] to the plan."[112] Also, this mentor was surprised that:

> …staffs were disintegrated and not more integrated after eight years being in country. Pressure from CSTC-A leaders forced time lines on Afghans that were not realistic. [Leadership] tells us to mentor on the decrees, but if it did not meet the US time line, then we were to ignore it.[113]

Another US mentor stated that individuals in higher levels of influence "…have never had to build, create, or assemble an ANSF unit from scratch. And unfortunately, by the time these individuals figure it out, it is time for them to go."[114]

4. No consolidated resource exists for learning about Afghan logistics prior to and during the deployment.

In conducting the research for this article the author collected information from a variety of sources. It became apparent early in this process that no consolidated resource existed for Afghan logistics training. The closest the author got to such a resource was searching through a collaborative lessons learned Web site and then drilling down into the Army's CALL Web site by typing in key words using the search engine. The lessons learned Web site contained a menu sidebar and allowed users to choose lessons learned from the combatant commands, Service branches, and other government agencies.[115]

Having a consolidated resource for Afghan logistics mentoring is important because it allows future mentors to learn from the challenges and issues faced by previous mentors. For individuals who are not familiar with the Army's combat advisory missions (Air Force and Navy filling ETT roles), it gives them a chance to find out a little more about what the mission entails. The 162[d] BDE Web site did have a "Head Start Center" page that provided suggested readings on Afghan counterinsurgency, Army field manuals, and other resources on becoming a mentor.[116] However, the Web site did not contain any specific resources on Afghan logistics. This same issue was identified in Captain Joseph E. Whittington's research when he identified that there is "no formal mechanism in place" for mentors to share their experiences.[117] One respondent commented that he had a great turnover with the person he was replacing at the FSD, but later missed out on turnover with his inbound replacement because of emergency leave.[118]

Potential Solutions

Afghan logistics training cannot be an afterthought and must be as much of a priority as shoot, move, and communicate training blocks at predeployment training. Based on the findings, there are four potential ways to better standardize Afghan logistics training between US and NATO mentors.



Figure 5. Requirements for OMLT Training[89]

1. Develop a standardized logistics platform for enhancing and teaching Afghan logistics to US and NATO mentors.

First, there needs to be more cross-sharing of training curriculum between the US and NATO predeployment training sites. Both the 162d BDE and JFTC are providing their mentors with the necessary training, but need to ensure they are following the same guidance and baseline in developing Afghan logistics mentors. One way to achieve this is by holding a recurring training conference where US and NATO mentors and training development SMEs come together and outline or discuss how to develop the proper Afghan logistics mentor. The conference could be held in the United States, Poland, or elsewhere. The sponsor could be CSTC-A/NTM's LTAG. LTAG is already responsible for mentor oversight in Afghanistan so it would be the perfect stakeholder to facilitate the event. The downside to this is bringing SMEs out of the field to attend the conference. Also, depending on the OEF operations tempo, conference attendance might be low and would require general officer endorsement to drive home the importance of getting the Afghan logistics mentor training right.

Another idea for cross-sharing information would be for the predeployment training sites to have an instructor exchange program. Instructors from Fort Polk and JFTC would be invited to guest lecture at the other's predeployment training. This would help each training site learn how the information was being presented along with the styles or techniques being used. Students would also gain insight into how their coalition counterparts are mentoring the ANSF along with the challenges they are facing. Because of the coordination involved, extensive planning and agreements would need to be established so that the program continued and did not lose momentum when the programs' points of contact were rotated out.

Second, Afghan logistics mentors should be taught separately from Iraq mentors and provided more specialized training at Fort Polk. Fort Polk's current POI does not give the instructors enough time to teach any in-depth Afghan logistics processes. Additionally, because the focus of the class is based on where the majority of the mentors will be sent, some mentors are under trained. The suggestion to teach Iraq and Afghanistan mentors separately has already been made by 162d BDE's instructors through their chain of command, but has not been implemented.[119] ETTs need to arrive in-theater ready to begin mentoring their Afghan counterparts. The best way to accomplish this task is by laying the foundation at predeployment training.

In order to conduct separate training events for Iraq and Afghan mentors, the 162d BDE could either lengthen the training schedule to accommodate both countries or hire additional instructors so Iraq and Afghanistan classes could be taught at the same time. The biggest drawback would be the manpower cost in either having an instructor teach two different classes or hiring more cadre members. If the 162d BDE hired additional instructors to teach Afghan logistics, it would help legitimize the predeployment training's credibility. The instructors would then be able to adequately address their students' questions and concerns about the upcoming deployment.

2. Invite mentors back to guest lecture at predeployment training and have them provide insights from their deployment experience.

Because Fort Polk's predeployment training currently does not have anyone with Afghan logistics experience, the 162d BDE should consider bringing in recent Afghan logistics mentors to guest lecture on their mentoring experience. One of the responses received was that there is a "…huge training gap and knowledge with mentors."[120] The JFTC has already incorporated deployed mentor lectures into its training program. This has proven beneficial as long as mentors are able to be released from in-theater to attend the training in Poland.[121] The benefit of this approach is that it is one way to augment the manpower required to conduct Afghan logistics training. It would also help enhance the overall training and reinforce the importance of learning Afghan logistics. The negative side to this approach could be that redeployed mentors might not be receptive to guest lecturing because of the personal experiences they had while deployed or lack of interest in participating.

3. Provide all mentors with an overview of Afghan logistics in addition to the specialized training for the designated S-4 mentors.

Just having only the S-4 mentors receive Afghan logistics training is not enough. Every mentor on the team should have an overview of the Afghan logistics process. This overview could be approximately 30 minutes and be incorporated into Fort Polk's in-processing and mission briefings that all personnel receive while attending predeployment training. The overview brief would also help reduce the tension and disconnects felt between mentors in the field and their higher headquarters by providing everyone with a basic understanding of the logistics process. It would also provide operational planners necessary background and situational awareness, both of which are essential in determining the logistics feasibility of potential mission—no more planning a mission and finding out at the last minute it is not logistically feasible. The predeployment training schedule would need to be adjusted to accommodate briefing.

Another option to strongly consider is providing specialized Afghan logistics training for the designated S-4 mentor. This would allow logistics mentors to receive in-depth instruction on the Afghan logistics process. It would also give the logistics mentors time to absorb the material without having to rush through it. The most difficult part of implementing this option is identifying the right person (mentor) to attend training and not just having anyone attend in order to fill the slot.

Additionally, just because a team trains together at Fort Polk does not guarantee they all will stay together upon arrival in Afghanistan. As mentioned earlier, Afghan logistics training is not something that only the team's S-4 mentor should worry about. Everybody on the team needs an understanding of how the Afghan logistics process works.

4. Develop a consolidated Web resources page or pages for Afghan logistics mentors.

Anyone who has ever used an internet search engine (Google, Bing) understands how quickly a person can become overwhelmed with the search results while trying to decipher what information is and is not important. The author experienced this problem first hand in researching ETT lessons learned on the Army's CALL Web site. One way to help speed the process is by adding a Web page to the 162d BDE training site specifically geared towards Afghan logistics mentors. The Web page could contain a bibliography of references pertaining to Afghan

logistics as well as briefings and forms that would benefit mentors. It would also be extremely beneficial to have the 162d BDE advertise to all the Services that the Web page exists. Implementing this could be as simple as adding a banner announcement to the main part of the 162d BDE Web page and ensuring all required materials are available.

With regard to CALL's Web site, another idea would be for CALL to add a category specifically dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan logistics mentors. Mentors would be able to see the latest resources regarding Afghan logistics training and the mentoring mission. They would also have the latest lessons learned already identified at their finger tips. This idea requires discussions with CALL officials to see if it is feasible.

Conclusions and Recommendations

With President Obama's announcement of increasing troop strength, the US and NATO's combat advisory mission will not be going away anytime soon in Afghanistan.[122] Therefore, based on the research, the author recommends implementing the following three recommendations. First, US and NATO forces need to have a standardized platform in place to ensure all logistics mentors receive the right kind of Afghan logistics training. The key to making this happen is to have the predeployment sites, such as 162d BDE at Fort Polk and JFTC in Poland, team-up and cross-share information on a consistent basis.

Second, it is vitally important that US mentors receive as much specialized Afghan logistics training as possible before deploying into the theater. Once mentors arrive in country, it is too late to try and provide the right training while at the same time performing the mentoring mission. This recommendation does not imply mentors should stop learning once they get in country. However, trying to run mentors through a formal training program at that point is much more difficult and late-to-need.

Third, since many Service personnel are experiencing Afghan mentoring for the first time, more emphasis needs to be placed on having all mentors receive an overview on Afghan logistics processes. Also, a consolidated list of resources needs to be established and advertised so that once someone gets selected for a mentoring team deployment, he or she can begin preparing ahead of time. Implementing this could be as simple as adding a resource link on the Army's CALL Web site or Army Knowledge Online and having the other Services' portal pages link back.

In order for the ANSF forces to start taking over sustainment and security responsibilities from the US and NATO by 2011, they need to have a logistics system in place that is standardized and seamless across the entire country.[123] The only way this will happen is if US and NATO forces are following the same guidelines and overarching objectives when mentoring the Afghans on logistics operations. Properly trained US and NATO mentors on Afghan logistics is a critical first step to the overall success of the mentoring process.

Future Research Opportunities

The author recommends conducting future research in the following areas.

- How are the US and NATO forces actually mentoring their Afghan counterparts and what are the end results?

This article focused solely on how US and NATO mentors were being trained in Afghan logistics. The next step is to explore how actual mentoring is being implemented and examine the end results.

- Are there enough US and NATO personnel identified to adequately mentor the Afghan forces? With the increase in additional US forces and the decision to accelerate growth of the ANA and ANP to 240,000 and 160,000 respectively, are there enough personnel identified to support the mentoring mission?[124]

This research would require examining the ANSF development time line while comparing it to the mentors' force flow to see whether or not there is adequate coverage for the mentoring mission.

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78. Consolidated responses were compiled by the author based on participants' responses.
79. Information contained in Table 6 was compiled by the author based on participants' responses.
80. Author's telephone interview with unnamed Major, Senior Advisor to 2d Forward Support Depot, 8 March 2010.
81. Information contained in Figure 5 was compiled by the author based on participants' responses.
82. Consolidated responses from First Lieutenant at CFC J4; Major at 1st FSD; and Lieutenant Colonel from Central Workshop.
83. Consolidated responses from Colonel, TF Phx Chief of Staff, OMLT Log Coordinator; Master Sergeant of ANP NCOIC; and Colonel, Former ARSIC-K Commander.
84. Consolidated responses from Major, Senior Advisor to ANA Logistics Command, Commanding General; Major at 2d FSD; Lieutenant Colonel for LTAG Integration Branch; and Major for CJTF Phx VII.
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Core values make the military what it is; without them, we cannot succeed. They are values that instill confidence, earn lasting respect, and create willing followers. They are the values that anchor resolve in the most difficult situations. They are the values that buttress mental and physical courage when we enter combat. In essence, they are the three pillars of professionalism that provide the foundation for military leadership at every level.

—Sheila E. Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force

I cannot trust a man to control others who cannot control himself.

—Gen Robert E. Lee, CSA

When the political and tactical constraints imposed on air use are extensive and pervasive—and that trend seems more rather than less likely—then gradualism may be perceived as the only option.

—Gen Joseph W. Ralston, USAF

It is the politics of the moment that will dictate what we can do.… If the limits of that consensus mean gradualism, then we're going to have to find a way to deal with a phased air campaign. Efficiency may be second.

—Gen John P. Jumper, USAF

The preeminence of air power will stand or fall not by promises and abstract theories, but, like any other kind of military power, by its relevance to, and ability to secure, political objectives at a cost acceptable to the government of the day.

—Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason, RAF